THE NEW REPUBLIC

New Approaches to Foreign Aid

Louis J. Walinsky

Western Europe and Berlin

Terence Prittie *Jean Daniel*

Ernest Hemingway — *Irving Howe*

Sherman Adams — *Sidney Hyman*

The Spanish War — *Daniel Friedenberg*

O'Connor's Irish — *Patrick O'Donovan*

July 24, 1961, 25

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T.R.B. *from Washington*

Goldwater and Taft

★ We keep seeing Goldwater compared to the late Bob Taft as the darling of conservatives. We thought about it the other day as we passed the incongruous 100-foot carillon, with 25 bells, erected to Taft's memory on the Capitol grounds. He is the only such Senator ever so honored. One of the bells, we imagine, has a slight discordance in it recalling the rasping voice and bleak clarity of the Ohioan.

Will a Goldwater carillon be erected some day across from Taft's? If so their contrapuntal jangle will be worth hearing. Both men led forays from the archaic blockhouse of the Senate against the great forward movement of history. Taft practically paralyzed American diplomacy toward China by encouraging McCarthy against what Taft called "this pro-Communist Administration." But Taft had substance and power and a dour kind of integrity. He believed in a minimum floor under everybody. We can remember Bricker's stricken cry on the Taft housing bill: "The socialists have got to Bob Taft!"

Compared to Taft, Goldwater is a dashing romantic. He is handsome, can pilot an airplane. Taft wrote his own speeches, Stephen Shedegg ghosts Goldwater's, as he did *The Conscience of a Conservative*. Taft after study could change views as he did on federal aid to education; his school bill ultimately died in the House on the parochial school issue. Goldwater never changes views on anything; he tried to defeat the pending school bill in the Senate by just such a parochial school amendment as killed Taft's.

France, Britain and the US reply to Moscow this week on Berlin – and high time, too! The ably edited London *Times* and *Daily Telegraph*, probably reflecting the Foreign Office, think the Kennedy Administration has been slow in setting policy. There has been a gap of six weeks since Mr. K gave his grim terms to Kennedy at Vienna. Moscow and Washington have tried to shake each other in a war of nerves.

Having burned its hands on Cuba the Administration has decided not to be stampeded on Berlin. So far as one can gather Kennedy is calm and confident. This is an admirable mood in a crisis. But delay itself has dangers. Lacking other issues Republicans are trying to freeze Kennedy into an inflexible policy line. A weekend attack by the staff of the House GOP Policy Committee, for example, lists as "fundamental errors" what it calls "the general feeling the Administration has been 'soft' on the Berlin crisis." It attacks "softness" again in its summary. Dirksen, Halleck, Goldwater won't be happy till they have us in a nuclear war.

Kennedy, presumably, will tell the country the score this week at his press conference. We wish he would go direct to the nation and address it in a fireside chat. Even if he has little factually new to communicate he can convey the all-important mood; he can set the tone. Nobody in this country can do that but the President. It is part of his job; maybe the most important part.

How Serious Is It?

★ Anxious people keep asking us, "How serious is it?" Nobody really knows but Khrushchev. He told Ghana's President Nkrumah in Moscow: "Even if all the countries of the world adopted a decision that did not accord with the interests of the Soviet Union and threatened its security, the Soviet Union would not recognize such a decision but would uphold its rights, relying on force. And we have the wherewithal to do this." Granting Mr. K's volatility, nobody has talked that way since Hitler.

A lot of Congressmen faced a horrible discovery last week; they confront a big new public-vs-private power issue. Potentially it is bigger than TVA and it won't go away because it is part of the new nuclear age. The new $145 million reactor at Hanford, Wash., under the Bonneville Power Administration, starts generating next year. It takes uranium and produces plutonium. It also produces by-product heat, in the form of low pressure, low temperature steam. This heat can be turned into electricity. Shall the government spend $95 millions more for electric generators at Hanford to produce public power, or let the heat go to waste down the Columbia River as a kind of central heating project for the surprised fish?

The House Votes for Waste

★ This sounds fantastic because most people haven't heard about it yet, but it wasn't fantastic to the House of Representatives last week, which voted, 176 to 140, to kill the Administration's $95 million electric generating project. The Senate may restore the fund. In any case the debate is just starting.

Just at Hanford alone the prospective heat, if harnessed, could produce 750,000 KW hours of electricity, it is estimated, or enough to serve a city of a million people. If harnessed it would be the largest bloc of nuclear power generated anywhere in the world. It would be twice the energy produced at Bonneville Dam. But it would be *public* power. From that thought the Congressional conservatives recoiled in horror.

Rep. Craig Hosmer (R, Cal.) called the proposal part of "the decades-old scheme of Fabian Socialists." Rep. Donald C. Bruce (R, Ind.) denounced "socialist planners." Rep. James Van Zandt (R, Penna.) reluctantly admitted it would be the largest bloc of power produced "from one heat source" in the world but, he said, a "more basic" issue outweighed such benefit – it would plunge the government even further into "the electric power industry."

We don't see how this issue will go away. Government nuclear reactors are going to produce free by-product heat. Even that old creeping socialist Ralph Cordiner, head of General Electric, recommended dual use to the AEC in 1953, and former AEC chairman Admiral Strauss urged multi-purpose reactors. But true believers reject such appeasement. "Steam heats the fish!" is their war cry.

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THE NEW REPUBLIC *A Journal of Opinion Volume 145 Number 4-5 Issues 2438-39 July 24, 1961*
Published weekly (except for omissions of four summer issues) and distributed by The New Republic, *1244 19th St., N.W., Washington 6, D. C. Phone: FEderal 8-2494. Single copy 25c. Yearly subscription, $8.00; Foreign, $9.00, Armed Forces personnel or students, $5.00. Advertising rates upon request. Subscribers desiring change of address should notify us at least three weeks in advance. Include old and new address.* *Copyright© 1961, by Harrison-Blaine, Inc.* *Item g. Second class Imprint, reading Second Class Postage Paid at Washington, D. C.*

Disarray at State?

THE WEEK

3. Disarray at State; Prelude to Negotiations; Ayub of Pakistan; Arms for Latin America; The Annual Agony; Migrants and Machines; Protection for Textiles

ARTICLES

9. Gaitskellites Ride High
by Alastair Burnet

11. The Pressures on Khrushchev
by Jean Daniel

12. Three Months In Which To Act
by Terence Prittie

14. The Superficial Aspect
by Gerald W. Johnson

15. New Approaches to Foreign Aid
by Louis J. Walinsky

DEPARTMENTS

19. Books 25. Feiffer 26. Movies
27. Art 30. Correspondence

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The Department of State is accustomed to being roughed up by members of Congress. During the past several weeks, however, the Department's conduct has been under fire not so much from Congress, but from one or two columnists, disgruntled old-timers within and without the Department and from some White House advisers. This has given rise to speculation about why this appearance of disarray and whether changes are needed to make State a more serviceable instrument of Mr. Kennedy's policies.

Since, in contrast to his predecessor, this President relishes the exercise of independent judgment and relies less on the agreed-upon staff paper, he is constantly looking for ideas. Within his official family, he welcomes the stoutly-defended statement, however controversial it may be. It is this flow of practical, policy alternatives that the President is said to miss in the Department. For example, though Dean Acheson was asked to prepare position papers on Berlin, Mr. Kennedy wanted to test Mr. Acheson's recommendations against others. But the Department's response was sluggish and uninventive.

Dissatisfaction with the Department has been fed too by Secretary Rusk's unassertive, conventional behavior. In six months, he has built a reputation for careful competence. Nevertheless, he has not so far emerged as a strong advocate, adviser, administrator or initiator. Though Mr. Rusk's analytical powers are incontestable, he has given the impression on significant matters of being the last man aboard whatever train is leaving.

Stories of intrigue and disaffection within the Department are attributable also to the natural resentment by the professionals – the career Foreign Service personnel – of specialists from the outside. Such resentments cannot, of course, be allowed by the President to prevail. In large measure, the 1960 election was fought so that new men, new energies, new approaches could be brought into the formulation of foreign policy. And the need to go beyond the career Foreign Service in framing that policy was recognized years ago by a present member of the White House staff, McGeorge Bundy: "Professional diplomacy, while a great instrument, can never be the master of the national purpose."

There are other contributing irritants. There is a widespread sense that something has gone wrong with our diplomacy (which is true, but the seeds of that were planted long ago); that it is the East, not the West, that is on the march; a disturbed public must be handed *some-*

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one it can blame – whether he is to blame or not. Moreover, the President's confidence as well as the public's in the Department was to some degree diminished by Secretary Rusk's reluctance to point out the disaster the United States would invite by the planned invasion of Cuba. In this instance, the Secretary did not see fit to forward to the President a memo outlining that danger, on his desk two weeks before the event.

Finally, tensions within the Department and between the White House and the Department are undoubtedly exacerbated by personal ambitions, personality clashes, and the perennial difference in policy emphasis between those whose primary concern is Europe and those who think in more global terms.

It is Dean Rusk who is responsible for whether his Department comes forth with ideas of value to the President, and who must make sure that those ideas are transmitted to and carried out by our representatives throughout the world. But to make him a scapegoat in this situation would be indecent. Mr. Rusk is a reasonable man and has made no catastrophic blunders (unless one includes his abstinence on Cuba) which would justify venting our frustrations on him. Moreover, things in the Department are not as bad as has been alleged; there is even some question whether the President's discontent is as great as has been claimed.

Furthermore, the Department of State is not synonymous with the Secretary alone. The President inspired widespread confidence by also choosing Chester Bowles as second in command of the Department and Adlai Stevenson as UN Ambassador; and he has every reason to want this team, with its complementary talents and accents to work together. In the absence of Mr. Rusk from the country, Bowles has been acting Secretary of State. He has been personally responsible for nearly all of the best Ambassadorial recommendations sent to the White House and accepted. He was Mr. Kennedy's adviser on foreign affairs during the campaign. He has, as Joseph Alsop pointed out last week, "energy and fertility in ideas" – two qualities that in present circumstances make him especially useful to the Secretary and the President. He has been a constructive force within the Department on behalf of the application of the principles of the Kennedy Administration. And, along with Mr. Stevenson and G. Mennen Williams, he has strengthened the trust of the non-European countries in the new Administration. This has been strikingly shown in their successful advocacy of a hard line against colonialism, especially in Angola. And the President's recognition of Mr. Bowles' contribution was shown by his prompt disavowal last Monday of any conspiracy to deliver the Undersecretary as a sacrificial goat.

Heretofore, Bowles' fertile ideas have not always come to flower because he has on no occasion since his appointment thought it appropriate to initiate communication directly with the President, nor has he been encouraged to do so. A change in that relationship in the direction of more frequent contact would, of course, be desirable so long as it would not thereby compromise the supremacy of Dean Rusk's status as the ranking executive in charge.

Prelude to Negotiations

Mr. Khrushchev's June 4 Memorandum, to which the US, UK and France have now replied, set forth two Soviet objectives: a peace treaty between the major allies in World War II and the two German states – a treaty acknowledging the sovereignty of the Communists in East Germany, but which encourages the two Germanys to work their way toward some kind of federation; and, agreement to "normalize the situation in West Berlin on the basis of reasonable consideration for the interests of all sides." The first of these objectives is not acceptable to this country for two reasons: First, because such formal recognition of East Germany in the absence of free elections would be anathema to the West Germans whose allegiance and contribution to the West is important; second, because such recognition would gratuitously assist the oppressive Communist dictatorship in East Germany and further demoralize those in satellite states who are not reconciled to an eternity under totalitarianism.

Whether Mr. Khrushchev concludes a peace treaty with East Germany this year or not, whether he turns over to that regime all occupation rights heretofore held by the Soviet Union or not, the West is neither obliged nor compelled to follow suit. The United States has in the past found no difficulty living in the same world with regimes it did not formally recognize. It has even negotiated or done business with them. The danger is not here. It is on Western access to Berlin. It is feared that the East Germans, encouraged by the Soviet Union, will block off the freeways to Berlin, and that thereafter an isolated West Berlin would collapse into the arms of those who surround it.

In his June 4 Memorandum, Mr. Khrushchev did say that "the free city of West Berlin should freely effect its communications with the outside world and . . . its domestic order should be determined by the free expression of the will of its population. . . ." He put forward tentatively that token troops of the four Great Powers or of neutral countries under UN auspices might be stationed in the "free city" as a guarantor of its independence. But, he added that West Berlin "must be strictly neutral . . ."; and that upon the conclusion of a peace treaty by the Soviet Union with East Germany, the right of access "will have to be settled not otherwise than through appropriate agreements with

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the German Democratic Republic."

If East German authorities do interfere with Western access to Berlin, the West has three alternatives: It can renege on its commitments to West Berlin, thus setting the stage for a probable neutralization of all Western Europe and a strong upsurge of Communist prestige; or, it can refuse to deal with any East German official on any matter involving communications with West Berlin, responding instead by shooting at the first sign of obstruction along the air corridors, the *Autobahns* or the canals; or, it can make it plain to the East German authorities *in advance* that it will not tolerate any impairment of its right of access and will hold the East German regime responsible if traffic is blocked. It is the latter course which is the most prudent.

But such a determination is not persuasive unless it is backed by the will and the capacity to contest with force any attempt by the East Germans to cut Berlin off. And this policy may require more than having in Europe a conventional military force by the end of this year, ready and able to fight a non-nuclear war with some reasonable chance of success. For although all sides would undoubtedly want to keep any conflict conventional, there is always the possibility that if peace is shattered in the middle of Europe, one side or the other would employ nuclear weapons. This possibility must be candidly faced and the risk consciously taken at the start. If it is not, we are dangerously deceiving ourselves and all the noble words about "firmness" are ultimately bluff.

But the readiness to accept the consequences of one's commitments to Berlin does not mean capitulation to despair. Even that rigid champion of firmness, Chancellor Adenauer, last week predicted that there would be negotiations on Berlin before the end of this year. If, however, negotiations are to be anything but capitulation to Soviet demands (and that can be done without negotiation), they must be preceded by a convincing demonstration that the West, in the absence of any agreement with the East Germans or the Soviet Union, *would* defend its right of access. That is why one hears of plans for rapidly beefing up US conventional military strength.

Mr. Kennedy anticipated this situation in an interview with John Fischer on December 9, 1959: "I think you must demonstrate your determination to fight. Otherwise you're holding a very tenuous position in Berlin. They could cut us off too easily. If we took the view which some Englishmen took, that Prague or the Sudeten Deutsch were not worth a war in '38 – if we took that view about Berlin, my judgment is that the West Berliners would pass into the Communist orbit, and our position in West Germany and our relations with West Germany would receive a fatal blow. . . . I think we have to make it cold – and mean it – that we would fight." But he likewise said that "there is perhaps an area where we could both make some agreement which would respect the relative position of both of us in that section of Europe, and still permit Berlin to live easier." And he said that although he could not then contemplate "a permanent solution of Berlin . . . I do think it may be possible for us to reach a *modus vivendi* with them, particularly if they feel that any real attack on our position in Berlin would bring war." And finally: "We would like to get a commitment, perhaps guaranteed by the United Nations, to reaffirm the concept of a corridor into Berlin and therefore free access to it, which would be controlled either by the United Nations or by the West Germans and the Berliners or by England, France and the United States. In return for that, we might agree to some thinning out of troops in Berlin. . . . We might agree to cease propaganda activities. German reunification, which represents the long-range goal, is certainly not in the cards for many years. These are matters which could be discussed at the summit."

Later, in an interview with this journal, he said that "possibly we can get some guarantees on the permanency of Allied entry and exit. . . ."

In brief, the will and the capacity to respond to any provocation with the appropriate means is not incompatible with negotiations. They go together.

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Ayub of Pakistan

President Mohammed Ayub Khan of Pakistan made an undeniably favorable impression on Americans who had been unaware of his personal force and political acumen. But in the hoopla of the Mount Vernon gala and the pilgrimages to Gettysburg and the LBJ Ranch, it was easy to forget that Ayub is not Pakistan; that his popularity rating in his own country has been on a slide, and that the US would do well to broaden its commitment to the country beyond a particular personality and in-group. Lawyers and teachers are disenchanted with the two-year-old Ayub regime and especially with his protracted stalling on promulgation of the new Constitution recommended by a handpicked commission nearly a year ago. Unrest is apparent among the Bengali majority (56 percent) of his truncated country, which feels left out and put upon by a capital from which it is separated by a thousand miles of Indian territory. The officially disbanded Moslem League Party is becoming an undercover focal point for anti-government discontent. Fatima Jinnah, who, as the sister of the late founder of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, is immune to reprisals by the regime, has been speaking out concerning the "malign forces robbing the people of their sovereignty," an attack not only on military rule in Pakistan but implicitly on the US as Ayub's patron. Inflation, food shortages, and a recrudescence of corruption among civil servants are all giving impetus to the anti-Ayub sentiment.

In the absence of any feasible alternative, the objective of US policy in Pakistan should in our view be the stabilization of the Ayub regime on a basis of a wider sharing of power. This means that Ayub should be pressed insistently to make good on his assurance that he sees "every chance of a freely elected government within a year or so." It does not necessarily mean that the election must resemble Western forms. The report of his Constitution Commission, though still secret, is said authoritatively to accept a multi-tiered indirect election as the first phase of a transition to eventual direct elections, but even a gradual shift of this sort toward popular accountability would be a welcome improvement over the present state of martial law.

As a result of the uncritical homage he received in this country, the somewhat vain Ayub may go home having concluded that he is the indispensable man – so indispensable, and so well established in Washington's affection that he need not bother with chancy things like a constitution and elections. But the longer he stalls in broadening the base of his regime, the greater the tendency of the opposition to blame the US for his repression, and to make it that much harder for the US to establish friendly relations with a successor regime.

It was his uncertain position in Pakistan that partly explained Ayub's desire to visit Washington now. But there were other reasons – the continuing problem of his relations with India (and China), his border dispute with Afghanistan over the nine million Pathan tribesmen who are nominally within Pakistan territory but are claimed by the Afghans (they are on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line, traditional boundary between the Indian subcontinent and Afghanistan). He came seeking support in this dispute, and the President apparently gave it to him, reiterating more explicitly than in the past US recognition of the Durand line as the Pakistan-Afghanistan boundary and conceding Ayub's right to use United States military assistance to quell Pathan uprisings.

The Ayub-Kennedy communique said that military aid was being given so that Pakistan could "maintain forces for the preservation of its security," omitting any reference to Communist aggression as the sole threat to Pakistan security recognized as legitimate by the US. Last May, Washington had protested when a plane supplied by the US strafed a Pathan village, and Ayub has been complaining ever since. The go-ahead he has now been given to use US arms against the Pathans is a significant and conceivably dangerous step in view of Russian military support for Afghanistan.

Some equally significant hint of a possible policy shift exacted from Ayub may have justified this US concession, a shift, one hopes, on the critical dispute between Pakistan and India over Kashmir. In the communique, Mr. Kennedy was said to affirm the desire of the US for a "satisfactory solution" of this prolonged dispute. He did not hamstring this by insisting, as the US has done previously, on a solution in accordance with the UN Kashmir resolution – that is, a solution by plebiscite. The omission is a departure in our policy more remarkable than that on the Pathans, and may have had some effect on Ayub. He spoke with unaccustomed restraint when he indicated, in effect, after having been at the White House, that a Kashmir settlement might not presuppose a plebiscite but might be accomplished through the good offices of an outside mediator who could himself ascertain "the feelings of the Kashmiri people."

Arms for Latin America

The Administration's proposed modest increase in military aid for Latin America and relaxation of restrictions on using it for internal security is in trouble at each end of the Capitol. Critics in both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee wish such aid to continue to be confined to hemisphere defense except in extraordinary circumstances of necessity certified by the President. Actually, aside

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from some antisubmarine functions, the joint hemisphere defense concept underlying our military cooperation with various Latin American governments since World War II is now about as outdated as cavalry. On the other hand, internal security within Latin American states has a bearing on the security of the American hemisphere as a whole. Attempts to pigeonhole the two separately are less than realistic. Whatever the terms of our aid legislation, it is scarcely practical to expect recipient governments to check in for Washington's OK before using their forces in civil emergencies.

After his recent Latin American tour, Adlai Stevenson candidly admitted having changed for the better his estimate of the role of the military in Latin America. The habit of viewing all these armies as the uncomprehending tools of oppressive upper-class rule has lost much of its validity. In some recent instances – Argentina and Venezuela – the military played a decisive role in eliminating oppressive regimes. In Colombia and Bolivia the armies have recently warded off civil threats from the Right.

Right-wing military dictatorship was rife in Latin America for more than a century before the United States began giving military assistance and has abated noticeably in the two decades since. Such fears as those expressed by Senator Morse, that our aid might be used to uphold tyrannies in Haiti and Paraguay seem farfetched – unless one assumes that this government is going to abandon all sense of proportion and all loyalty to the democratic hopes it has expressed. True, the problem of force within civil societies remains a basic and sensitive one in Latin America. But the answer calls for managing the problem rather than scorning it.

The Annual Agony

There is a line in the poetry of Ernest Dowson, "I cried for madder music, and for stronger wine." That is just about what Congress is going through in dealing with the foreign aid program. Congress is the man with the golden arm. It desperately needs a fix. In the long run it will vote for foreign aid not because it wants to, but because it can't break the habit.

Nonetheless, it always has to go through the act of writhing on the bed. And, it has to have the counsel of the Kremlin. It takes no research, only recollection, to establish the fact that every year since 1948, when foreign aid has come up to Capitol Hill, there has been a "crisis." Mr. Stalin and Mr. Khrushchev have always helped. They haven't missed once.

But this is crazy. Why should the foreign aid program depend every year upon a cry for madder music and for stronger wine. Why should it be an addiction instead of a settled policy?

Migrants and Machines

The AFL-CIO drive to organize California's farm workers has expired in a flurry of words. Jimmy Hoffa's Teamsters are moving in. They have just signed a union shop contract with one of the larger corporation farms employing several hundred agricultural workers in the Salinas Valley. Unlike the AFL-CIO's Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee, the Teamsters do not oppose the hiring of *braceros* (Mexican farm hands) when there is an apparent shortage of local labor. Comment by staff members of the AWOC, whose office in Stockton will shut down by the end of this summer, has been understandably bitter. If George Meany were working for the Teamsters, said Norman Smith, director of the Federation's two-and-a-half year effort to organize the state's farm labor force, "he could not have picked a more opportune time . . . to announce the suspension of our operation."

Mr. Meany's side of the story throws some light on the financial problem of organizing farm workers. The AFL-CIO's efforts since February, 1959, have cost the Federation $500,000. One of the troubles is that agricultural workers cannot pay dues on the same scale as industrial workers because on an hourly basis they earn less than half as much, and they are paid only when they are employed. Further, they move so much from job to job that any check-off of union dues is difficult. The union that seeks to organize this neglected group must be prepared to invest much for small returns over a long period. That is why Hoffa's move is probably more of a threat than a menace. He has the money to spend on any project that is likely to annoy Mr. Meany.

One of the results of this defunct drive, however, is something in which the Federation can take pride. As a result of its battles over union organization on the lettuce farms of Southern California, the cherry orchards of the San Joaquin Valley, and its efforts to unionize the peach and apricot pickers in other central and northern valleys of the state, hourly rates for agricultural workers in California have risen to about $1.25, or 20 percent above the national average for farm labor. To quote Mr. Smith again, "We have raised wages at least $20 million for California farm workers during the last two seasons. Together with the packinghouse workers we have forced the employers to put sanitary facilities in the fields. And we have forced them to cut down on the *braceros*."

But California growers have responded to these efforts in two other ways that have a certain significance for the future of labor relations in this farm-type industry (five percent of the farms in that state generate about 63 percent of the demand for labor). Two-thirds of the farm labor is used in short-term harvest operations, according to a fact-finding committee of the Cali-

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fornia State Senate whose report will be published shortly. Because of the availability of *braceros*, the report also notes, California growers have not competed actively with industry for seasonal workers; consequently all they can get, when they need hired hands, are "the leftovers of the domestic labor force."

Actually, some efforts to recruit domestic farm workers have been made, and the maximum number of *braceros* employed last year was reduced by more than 26 percent in comparison with 1957. However, the difficulty of dealing with raw domestic farm labor (chiefly from urban areas) plus the fear of unionism – the very thought of it appears to horrify most growers – has resulted in the establishment of a unique enterprise, the Agricultural Inter-Insurance Exchange which insures California farmers for 75 percent of the losses that may result from strikes during harvest time. Premiums for this "protection" range from one to four percent of the value of the crop. The other response of the growers has been the Farm Machinery Foundation.

The purpose of this Foundation is to promote the development of harvesting machinery that will enable growers to keep down the size of the farm labor force required at peak periods when harvests must be handled rapidly. A 10-day strike can cost a farmer all of the investment that has gone into the making of his crop. One of the first products of this program is an incredibly ingenious tomato-picking machine whose development has involved a combination of genetics and mechanical engineering. About two dozen of them are now ready to roll into the tomato fields where each will replace about 50 workers. At the rate of 2,000 tons of tomatoes per harvest, each of these machines is expected to save about $16,000 in wages – which is about what each costs. So next year they will work for free.

Jackhammer-type tree shakers and slingshot-like devices called tree knockers are being used at the present time to harvest fruit and nut crops. When these gadgets are through with a tree, all it has left are its leaves. Modifications of them are being built which will handle cherries, apricots and peaches. It is expected that apples, olives, oranges, pears and figs will also be roughed out of the trees in which they grow, but a little later. The geneticists, who work more slowly, are busy dwarfing commercial varieties of plants (so machines can straddle them) and toughening the skins of fruits and vegetables (so machines can handle them) and seeing to it that each crop matures all at once so that the dumb machines (which can only pick blindly, by the shape of things) will not harvest what is green with what is ripe, indiscriminately and wastefully.

In the meantime it looks as if the growers will have their way with the federal legislation that permits the importation of farm workers from Mexico: the House has passed a two-year renewal of Public Law 78 and Administration-supported efforts to amend it were rebuffed. Hearings on the same measure are imminent in the Senate Agriculture Committee. Senators McCarthy of Minnesota and Keating of New York have offered amendments which would restrict the use of foreign labor to unskilled work, leaving the power machine tending jobs in agriculture to domestic workers; and under Senator McCarthy's amendment the employment of foreign workers would be limited to a percentage of domestic farm labor. But although the Senate is more liberal than the House on this question, it is unlikely that there will be any substantial change in the legislation governing the movement of *braceros* unless the Administration intervenes more forcefully in this area than it has seen fit to do up to now. This is unfortunate because, with the withdrawal of the AFL-CIO, the only assistance that the least favored group in American labor can expect must, for the immediate future, come from the federal government. What is most urgently needed to protect domestic farm workers is the inclusion of at least one of Senator McCarthy's amendments to the projected extension of Public Law 78: that growers be required to offer conditions of employment to American farm workers comparable to those they must provide to migrant workers from Mexico.

Protection for Textiles

One of the most critical struggles in Washington today is being carried on almost out of sight. The question is whether this country believes or doesn't believe in steadily freer international commerce. It has generated a classic collision between foreign policy and domestic politics. The issue is textile imports. Senators and Representatives from textile states, forming a powerful and militant political force, are ranged on one side. The Department of State is ranged on the other. President Kennedy is in the middle, possibly facing a decision whether to take the regressive step of approving import quotas. The stakes are high: Textile-state votes in Congress, particularly Southern Democratic votes, on all parts of the 1961 Kennedy program in which Southern conservative ideology comes into play; and, next year, the renewal or abandonment of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.

The trouble for Kennedy probably started in the campaign, when he made some artful and ambiguous allusions to textile problems. It was made acute when North Carolina and South Carolina did well for him in the election. Textile pressure for restrictions on imports had been building up for six or seven years. For some mysterious reason, a politician regards a textile worker as having 10 times the voting strength of any other constituent – one, let us say, employed in an ex-

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port industry. In the absence of any dramatic or sudden adversity, but in awareness of its political hold on a new Administration narrowly elected and possessing only marginal strength in Congress, the textile politicians found it tactically wise to move in fast and hard. The cry for mandatory quotas, country allocations, quotas by categories and sub-categories, rose to a snarl. There were threatening expressions on the floor of both houses. A delegation of textile legislators visited the White House.

Mr. Kennedy did not need a diagram.

At his suggestion, two different means of possible solution are being developed. George W. Ball, Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, is attempting to work out an international agreement to stabilize the cotton textile trade while leaving room for growth. Advanced countries would be asked to accept more imports from low-cost producing countries, which would divert some of the pressure from the American market. At the same time, low-cost producing countries would be asked to restrain themselves in pouring their goods into the United States market. Mr. Ball has been holding conversations with the domestic interests in Washington, and hopes for an international conference at Geneva this month. This is an *ad hoc*, improvised effort to solve the domestic problem within the principles of US world trade policy. For the time being, efforts are being limited to cotton. That alone is a problem so complex that it commands the use of all available energies. Wool, a less difficult problem, but also of first importance politically, waits in line for its treatment.

At the same time, the industry is moving for relief from competition through the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Its case involves all its fibers. Its petition, under the national security clause of the Trade Agreements Act, seeks a finding that textile imports are a threat to national security. Given such a finding, it would be up to Mr. Kennedy, with such helpful advice as he would call in, to decide a remedy. Inasmuch as import quotas strike the fancy of the industry, it is almost certain as a practical matter that he would have to decide for or against import quotas.

The frightening circumstance is the blind commitment of the textile politicians to protection, and no such type is ever satisfied with less than 110 percent. The strong prospect is that even if Mr. Ball is successful with his resourceful economic diplomacy, textiles won't like it. Mr. Ball is emphasizing international policy rather than domestic politics; that is his job. If the industry runs true to form, it will say in effect, "Even if it's good we don't like it," and force a political decision from Mr. Kennedy. Until the issue is settled, the enlightened trade policy of the United States must be considered to be in hazard.

LABOUR BELIEVES IT SEES THE PROMISED LAND

Gaitskellites Ride High

London

Labour has almost convinced itself that it can do it next time. "Yes," said one of Mr. Gaitskell's chief lieutenants the other day, "I can see that limousine again." The prospect of office had been too improbable an hallucination for the Gaitskellite band to entertain in its weary years in the wilderness. That one of the party's toughest eggs, after months of beating off unilateralist guerrillas from the caravan, should let his thoughts stray now to the lush oasis is the measure of the strange and unforeseen prophesyings and portents that have come to pass. For this is the time of the second-year itch, when the Tory Government (as under Sir Anthony Eden in 1956) has lost its electoral momentum, run into economic difficulties, and seems, above all to its own back-benches, hangdog and unsuccessful in its foreign relations. So Labour, with an ear cocked for Selwyn Lloyd's strangled admissions that the brakes must be jammed hard down on Tory prosperity, is looking about and discovering that, after all, it is the best alternative government Britain possesses.

The political opportunity that this presents has coincided with the right-wing's triumphant reassertion of its control over the Labour Party. The Gaitskellite revival since the Scarborough conference last year has come about through determined in-fighting on the executive and in the unions and constituency parties, in which Mr. Gaitskell's personal stamina has been not the least important factor. Nothing is more certain than that unilateralism will be thrown out at the Blackpool conference in October. The only question is whether the left-wing of Michael Foot and Frank Cousins (who has been at bay even within his own Transport and General Workers' Union) will still contrive to rally the diehards in opposition to the Polaris submarine base in

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the Holy Loch. This will not be exclusively an argument over defense. The *USS Proteus* happened to drop anchor off the decaying heavy industrial area of the West of Scotland, where thoughts on nationalization as well as foreign policy are to the Left of Mr. Gaitskell's.

The party's right-wing, now that it is in the ascendant, is pressing its advantage inside the unions as well, chiefly in clamping down on the unofficial strikes in the motor and other industries which, over the years, have done much to dull Labour's electoral image. This shaking of fists against Communist organizers and shop stewards by leaders like Bill Carron of the Amalgamated Engineering Union has not led to any results yet. But the Right has been stirred by the court decision early this month that the Communist-controlled Electrical Trades Union had blatantly rigged the last election of its general secretary in order to prevent a Glaswegian anti-Communist, John Byrne, from getting the job. An ill-judged attempt by the present chairman of the Trades Union Congress, the eccentric and ebullient Ted Hill, to pooh-pooh the union's chicanery (he claimed that President Kennedy's election might also be dubious) was promptly howled down almost throughout the Labour Party.

What is evident is that Labour's newly-published home policy statement, *Signposts for the Sixties*, is very much the flexible instrument that the Gaitskellites have wanted and could even fight an election on. The new policy insists on the need for long-term economic planning, and for the first time in years Labour can expect a hearing from those middle-of-the-road voters who have lost confidence in Tory juggling with bank rates, purchase tax increases and installment-buying restrictions. Even the very word planning, after M. Monnet's successes in France, is no longer the red rag it used to be to the Federation of British Industries. Labour's new emphasis, moreover, is more on the governmental control of investment to secure economic expansion than on the actual public ownership of the means of production. Old-fashioned nationalization is promised for such commanding heights of the economy as steel and road haulage, but otherwise less rigid formulas are envisaged. One significant approach is that industries (like aircraft firms and drug manufacturers) which depend very largely on state purchasing should be brought under closer control. Again, where development is lagging (as in some branches of the machine tool industry) the state would intervene and bring the work of its own National Research Development Corporation to bear upon the recalcitrant offenders.

It cannot be assumed, however, that a Labour Government would, in the event, be able to authorize its National Industrial Planning Board to concentrate on expansion in terms of strict economic priority. It is just as likely that, to satisfy Labour's voting strongholds in the declining industrial areas of the north and west, industry would in practice be directed to mop up unemployment as and when it occurred. The danger of bureaucratic rigidity looms up again in another major plan to put all building development in state hands. To hold down soaring land values around London, Birmingham and other large conurbations Labour proposes a Land Commission which would purchase the freeholds of all development sites above the private home and garage level, and then negotiate with the developer a share of the ensuing profits both for itself and for the local city or county authority concerned. This is well in advance of anything that the Tories are likely to consider. The obvious danger is that it could stop a good deal of land from coming forward for development at all.

Labour's wholehearted devotion to expansion rather than controls for their own sake is therefore still suspect, although in a small and overcrowded island the conception of tighter planning will eventually have to be taken more seriously by the Tories themselves. At the same time, Labour is still anxious to redivide the existing cake through the social services. Pensions have become one of the key issues for an aging electorate. Labour, acutely aware that it would have lost up to 30 more seats last time if some 350,000 pensioners had not swung its way, is now pushing a national scheme for half-pay on retirement. It is bitterly opposed to the present Tory trend toward reducing the health service charge on the Treasury by upping the basic contribution and prescription payments. Labour's biggest bid to the middle class in southeast England and the Midlands, among whom it lost votes last time, is a promise to expand university education, cut the size of state school classes and reduce the social bias of the private, residential schools.

This is a revisionist program, not a full-blooded socialist one. Its difference from the new Toryism of the younger Tory MPs elected in 1959 is apparent enough to the electorate, but it is, in many ways, a difference rather of degree than of kind. Labour's case for planning could be a winner only if the next election were fought during a recession, which Mr. Macmillan has no intention of doing. The main calculation for Mr. Gaitskell, however, is that it is a policy which can reunite the party itself under right-wing leadership. So Labour is settling down once more to be an alternative government, not a congeries of conflicting and experimental oppositions. Has the leadership learned the lesson of its past troubles? The Gaitskellites at least have a strong sense of having done too many of Mr. Macmillan's jobs (particularly in sustaining the nuclear deterrent) for him in the last two years. They are resolved not to repeat the mistake now, which certainly means not bearing the brunt of any campaign to join the European common market. ALASTAIR BURNET

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DE GAULLE, ADENAUER AND THE BERLIN CRISIS

The Pressures on Khrushchev

Paris

Following the various meetings of Western statesmen in Washington (with ambassadors), and in Vienna and Paris (between ministers), the French, the English, the Americans and the Germans appear to agree on their analyses, if not on the solutions, for the Berlin problem.

In the first place, it now appears certain that Khrushchev will provoke a very serious crisis early this fall. This certainty is based not only on the more or less inflammatory speeches of the Soviet leader, but also on the internal situation of Russia as it is reported by several experts, who, for once, are unanimous in their conclusions. According to these experts, Stalinist and pro-Chinese opposition to Khrushchev has been resumed with special vigor, both in the Politburo and at Communist Party headquarters in each of the Soviet republics. The moment has arrived when, if he wishes to survive, Khrushchev must proceed to a further de-Stalinization campaign – in other words, to purges perhaps of a less peaceful character than post-Stalinist Russia has yet encountered. Khrushchev's difficulties do not arise, as is too often written, from ideological differences with Mao Tse-tung, but instead from the support Mr. K's opponents inside the Soviet Union and within various Communist parties (especially in France and in Africa) find in China. However, such purges cannot be carried out by Khrushchev except in a climate of exceptional international tension, or of spectacular success.

Journeys into space, battles on the United Nations front, brilliant verbal intervention in Cuba or Laos – all these are no longer enough. The opposition must be defeated on its own ground – on the field of anti-Westernism. This requires a hardening of attitudes in local conflicts and casting doubt on the doctrine of peaceful coexistence between capitalists and Communists. It is within the framework of tensions leading to a mobilization of public opinion in fear of total war that Khrushchev can, on the one hand, carry out his purges and liquidate his opposition, and, on the other hand, show that public opinion, including Communist public opinion, dreads a conflict which could be nuclear.

If this analysis is well-founded – and there is every reason to believe that it is; if Khrushchev has domestic reasons for needing a crisis, then we are really faced with an especially serious danger. We can be sure that, under these conditions, the Russians will, as is said, "go the limit." But what limit? The method attributed to Khrushchev is one of multiplying local conflicts throughout the world, parallel with an accentuation of the Berlin crisis. In each of these local conflicts, Khrushchev will demonstrate that he is not bluffing and that he will no longer be satisfied merely to make threats in order to convince the West that he means business on Berlin.

Obviously, Mr. K may favor prudence during the first stage. For example, during his passage through Paris, Senator Humphrey stated to several high persons in French political circles that Khrushchev would go no farther in intervening in Cuba. But General de Gaulle is convinced that in Laos, in Angola, in Algeria, in the Middle East, at the disarmament conference, and at the next meeting of the United Nations, we must expect a spectacular renewal of the Cold War. The first sign of this was the concluding of a separate peace between the USSR and North Korea. This treaty can have no other objective, since it is not even certain that it was concluded in the interests of the North Korean Government; it is possible that the latter may feel itself more compromised than aided in the eyes of the South Koreans, who, in their unfortunate situation, have dreamed of reunification.

But Soviet strategy also appears to be beamed against China, if one takes into account the support given by Khrushchev to Yugoslavia, to India, and to all the neutral countries who have good reason to fear the consequences of Chinese policies in the disengaged countries – countries which are to hold a very important conference in Belgrade this coming September 1.

What, precisely, can happen on the German question? Khrushchev will sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany; this is almost a certainty. Next, East Germany will demand the right to replace the Russians in authorizing the various passes and documents of the Allied military personnel traveling between the Federal Republic of Germany and Berlin. And then what?

For his part, General de Gaulle favors a categorical refusal of any request by a country (East Germany), the existence of which the West does not recognize. On this point, President Kennedy confirmed his agreement with de Gaulle at the time of his Paris visit. In principle, Great Britain would also be of the same opinion, but for the past several weeks, more or less authorized, and in any case very important voices have been heard in London raising the possibility of a *modus*

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vivendi which would lead to a *de facto* though not a *de jure* recognition. If, however, the West stands unequivocally by a refusal to entertain relations with East Germany, it would be necessary to have recourse to an airlift again to supply Berlin with food. If, during the course of the airlift, an Allied plane were to be intercepted, then, through the interplays of reprisals, a world war might be touched off. General de Gaulle is convinced that this would not happen. There will be no war, he says, if Khrushchev is convinced that the Allies are not divided and will set up an even more massive and efficient airlift than in 1948.

Others, including Marshal Montgomery in England and former Minister Jules Moch in France, believe that, contrariwise, the danger of war is very serious. Moch, who is when all is said and done a very Western type of socialist and a very anti-Communist one, and who represents France at the disarmament conference, favors the recognition of East Germany and its admission to the United Nations at the same time as that of the Federal Republic of Germany. Moch says: "If we should not capitulate under threats, we should, nonetheless, negotiate, even under threats, in order to save the peace. . . . In exchange for recognition of the Pankow government, we must demand and obtain the status of a free city not only for West Berlin, as Khrushchev proposes, but also for the four Berlin sectors: the three Western sectors and the one Eastern one – the free city being constituted as United Nations territory, with a symbolic garrison of blue-helmeted soldiers." The proposal is not dissimilar to that put forward by Senator Mansfield. M. Moch seems to think that Lord Home and Mr. Macmillan might possibly support this attitude and this procedure.

These various and divergent opinions are, of course, familiar to Mr. Khrushchev and he has even quoted them (without naming their source) in one of his latest statements. General de Gaulle is greatly disturbed by this exploitation on the part of the East of the rifts in the solidarity of the West; he is convinced that we are heading for a second Munich and says as much in private discussions. He would like France – in other words, he would himself like – to be able to stand firm. For this reason, above all, he is impatient at what he deems to be the bad will of the Algerians in the negotiations at Evian. For this reason, too, he would like to be rid of the Algerian problem before autumn. We can thus hope that the Franco-Algerian negotiations, which are to be renewed on July 17, will be more fruitful, for perhaps now the French Government will at long last decide to acknowledge the FLN as the official representative of the Algerian people – something it has not heretofore done, although it pretends that it has, at Evian. It will do this because, since he no longer can be a party to splitting the West, General de Gaulle can no longer leave Khrushchev any cause to think that France can be wooed by Soviet support for the French in Algeria, as was the case two years ago.

Two observations must be made: The first is that uncertainties among the Western Allies about which de Gaulle frets, are in part the work of France and of de Gaulle's concept of Western strategy. The second is that a firm attitude is dependent on that attitude's being both morally indisputable and popular. Yet everyone, or at least everyone in Europe, knows that even the most anti-Communist public opinion will not risk a nuclear war over the status of Berlin. If in the past there was reluctance to "dying for Danzig," it is more certain that no one today wants to be annihilated for Berlin. This is what lends strength to those voices in France and in England which are being raised in favor of a negotiation, and which are causing that division about which General de Gaulle complains.

JEAN DANIEL

Three Months In Which To Act

Bonn

On July 6 Willy Brandt, the Social Democratic candidate for the Chancellorship in this autumn's West German elections, proposed the holding of an international peace conference attended by the 52 nations which fought Nazi Germany. The ostensible purpose would be to discuss a German peace treaty. But its more immediate purpose would be to mobilize world opinion against Nikita Khrushchev and Walter Ulbricht, who have been paving the way with almost maniacal pre-occupation for a Berlin crisis at the end of this year. Brandt is aware that the Berlin issue, more than any other, could lead to war.

Brandt points out that the Communist leaders have been talking about the need "to liquidate the left-overs

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of Hitler's War." And they have gone on to say that a peace treaty should be based on the "natural consequences" of that war – chief among them the division of Germany into two separate states. This hypothesis is then used by the Communists to justify the threat that – failing peace treaties with both German states – the Communist bloc will sign one with the East German Republic alone.

Brandt has offered excellent arguments in favor of his "super peace conference." He believes it would show the Soviet Union that world opinion is strongly on the side of a fair solution of the German problem – for he is sure that a big majority of the 52 nations would reject any Soviet proposal which could lead to increased tension in and over Berlin. It would show, too, that the West is ready to discuss the German question as a whole – which would compromise the Soviet allegation that the West wishes to avoid, even sabotage, negotiations. The "super peace conference" might deflect, if not de-rail Khrushchev's present intention to sign a separate peace treaty, achieve full East German sovereignty, transfer shared control over Berlin's communications from the Soviet to East German hands, and thereafter wage a war of nerves against the two and one-half million inhabitants of West Berlin and the Western Powers who are responsible for their freedom and independence.

Willy Brandt is not an outstandingly clever man, but he is eminently sensible. And common sense rather than cleverness will be more useful in countering Communist pressure in Germany which – unless countered – will lead to crisis and, possibly, to world war. In his common sense way, Brandt, perhaps not entirely intentionally, has pointed to one essential failure in Western diplomacy – the failure to evolve a negotiating basis for the recapture of diplomatic initiative. The West has so far blankly turned down a whole string of Communist proposals – for a zone of limited armaments in Central Europe, for a Confederation of two German states, for the signing of German peace treaties, for all-German talks "at one table." There has been an almost wearisomely repetitive assertion that the West will not "desert" West Berlin, or recognize the East German Republic or allow East German supervision of those of Berlin's communications for which the Soviet Union has hitherto been responsible. The attitude of the West may have been firm; it has not been constructive.

This has been recognized by a great many critics, but the critics have themselves fallen into error. Some have assumed that the way to avert disaster is by working out some "deal" which the Russians might possibly accept. One school of thought wants recognition of the East German Republic or of the Oder-Neisse Line "traded" for firm Soviet guarantees for the maintenance of a free West Berlin. Another school of thought would denude West Berlin of allied troops in return for the same guarantees. Yet another would agree to the permanent division of Germany (which the Soviet Union wants anyway) if the 17 million East Germans were allowed to elect their own government freely. Proposals of "deals" of this kind merely suggest to Khrushchev and his advisers that there may possibly be more chance than before of wringing concessions out of the West.

There has also been a shocking failure by the West Germans to explain to the outside world just what a foreign-installed, Communist tyranny in Eastern Germany amounts to. There has been an equally bad failure by the West German Government to develop or support ideas for breaking the diplomatic deadlock (one such idea was the so-called "Macmillan Plan" for a zone of equalized armaments in Germany, which Dr. Adenauer rejected out of hand). There has, in short, been extreme mental laziness; and the Soviet leaders have taken full advantage of it.

It is a misfortune that Western Germany is now in the throes of a Federal Election campaign. Already the Federal Minister of Defense, Franz-Josef Strauss, has denounced Brandt's plan – either out of sheer stupidity but more probably for electioneering purposes. West German parliamentarians have gone on holiday, or departed from Bonn for their constituencies. Dr. Adenauer's mind is given up to the problem of how to win on September 17. And the odds are all on Khrushchev beginning to implement his plans for Berlin and Germany only a month after that.

The West has probably three months in which to act, and if it does not act its very inaction will increase the chances of the Communist bloc committing itself to terribly dangerous steps in Berlin. There is a great deal that can be done. The West can elaborate Willy Brandt's proposal of a super peace conference – which should be held in Berlin, where the nations of the world can get a first-hand picture of the Berlin problem. The West can jolt the West Germans into informing world opinion more fully about the East German Republic; for the counterpart to a free, prosperous and generally respected West German Republic is an Eastern Germany which is ruled by an alien tyranny, which is losing 200,000 citizens a year, which is in the throes of economic crisis and which is the worst possible shop-window for the Communist world. The West should consider putting the plight of the East German refugees before the United Nations. And it should place the illegal rearmament in East Berlin, the Communist kidnappings of West German citizens, the persecution of the Christian Churches in Eastern Germany and the continued incarceration of 10,000 political prisoners before the bar of world opinion. Terence Prittie

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What Is Kennedy?

The Kennedy Administration is now six months old – one-eighth over – and the most striking thing about it is the fact that its essential character is not yet clearly apparent unless, perhaps, to observers far more penetrant than this one.

There are two explanations of this, equally plausible, but leading to diametrically opposite estimates of the value of the regime. One is that Mr. Kennedy is an exceptionally wise leader; the other is that he is shrewd, but essentially hollow. In either case it was to be expected that after his first six months his superficial aspect would still be puzzling observers with no inside information and not gifted with second sight.

One thing is certain: his election propelled him into a situation as nasty as any new President has faced, certainly since Roosevelt II, and perhaps since Lincoln. In such circumstances a wise man seizes any stopgap available at the moment, but develops his long-range plans slowly and without premature publicity. A shrewd man also resorts to stopgaps, but if he is merely shrewd and nothing more, he is incapable of developing long-range plans. Either would act precisely as Kennedy has acted.

Kennedy is a first-rate politician, therefore he is bound to be a shrewd fellow; but so is every really effective statesman. When it came to playing smart politics, Lincoln could run rings around Douglas, Seward, Chase and the other presumed masters of the art; so the fact that Kennedy put the skids under Truman, Stevenson, Symington and Lyndon Johnson, to say nothing of the Honorable Richard Nixon, is no proof that he hasn't the making of a great statesman. But neither is it proof that he has.

The Cuban fiasco was bad. It would be fatuous to deny it, but the fact that it was so very bad argues against the theory that the President is a smart political operator and nothing more. Animal cunning might have kept him out of that trap, and after he had fallen into it a weasel-minded man would have used every device to dump the whole thing into Eisenhower's lap. Instead, Kennedy grimly assumed full responsibility. Whatever else that may have been, it wasn't slick politics; and it may have been his way of notifying the country that he has put back on the President's desk the sign that Truman had on it: "The buck stops here."

As much may be said of the allegation that he wasted his time in Europe because he got nowhere with Khrushchev. That may be, probably is significant. But it is at least equally significant that in Europe he pleased everybody except Khrushchev, and he went there fully resolved to please everybody except Khrushchev. He seems to have accomplished what he set out to do.

After the interview Khrushchev decided to devote to additional armament money that everybody knows he desperately needs for other purposes. That may, or may not, presage an attack; but it certainly means that Khrushchev has decided that he can't scare this fellow with mere words and therefore he must be ready with cannon, the last argument of kings. If cannon also fail, Khrushchev may fight, but it is at least conceivable that he may abandon terror as an instrument of national policy and fall back on some form of compromise.

If the event proves that Kennedy has provoked a war, then he is a flatter failure than John Foster Dulles, and the United States is guilty of having sent a boy to do a man's job. But if he has brought the Russians to the point at which they will eventually see reason, he is not only assured of a place in history, but assured of a high one. At present, the argument in favor of one point of view is about as strong as the argument in favor of the other. We simply don't know.

As usual, there are many thousands who are quite certain that they do know – Mr. Nixon, for a conspicuous example – and they constitute a threat to the country rivaling that of the Red Army. The besetting sin of democracies has always been their tendency to make up their minds on insufficient evidence, as in 1812, when we fought England on the certainty that she would never revoke her Orders in Council, whereas she had already revoked them. But the shooting had started before we heard the news.

Liberals and conservatives alike are in danger of making a comparable error with regard to Kennedy – and they may make it either way, by attributing to him either virtue or villainy in excess of reality. We don't know, and to what Walter Lippmann once called "the omnicompetent citizen" – not without irony, of course – that is an unendurable state of mind. Suspension of judgment is torture. Rather than suffer it we risk calling Washington a tyrant, Lincoln a baboon, Roosevelt a traitor, and Kennedy – well, you name it, and somebody will immediately call him something worse.

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New Approaches to Foreign Aid

by Louis J. Walinsky

There must be a great many Americans who, reading the news from Laos, South Vietnam, South Korea and Iran in recent weeks, have begun to wonder what was accomplished by the billions of dollars which the United States has poured into those countries since the end of the Korean War in 1953. In none of these countries now in crisis did our aid contribute significantly to building a sounder economy sufficiently responsive to the aspirations of its people, or persuade the anti-Communist governments we supported to amend their near-dictatorial, corrupt and anti-reform character in ways which would enlist the wholehearted support of their people and reduce their vulnerability to Communist propaganda and internal explosion. If these results are what we must expect from foreign aid, has not the time come to rethink the whole business? Certainly, the Administration has so concluded. Its new approach does much to remedy the errors of the past. But the new approach does not dispel all doubts, even the doubts of many who until recently have been unreserved supporters of foreign aid.

Our unfortunate experience arises in large part out of the fact that our aid program of the 1950's was directed in most countries toward military and Cold War objectives. It was designed primarily to help such countries build and maintain a defense structure much stronger than they would have been able to support out of their resources, and, to a larger extent, to dispose of bothersome US farm surpluses. It was not designed primarily, or even importantly, to help these countries achieve accelerated economic development in ways which would enable them, within the foreseeable future, to assume responsibility for further self-sustained economic growth, or to initiate and carry through social and economic reforms essential to such growth and to political and social stability. It failed, therefore, to strengthen them against internal disaffection at the same time that it sought to strengthen them, and us, against external dangers. All too often it associated the US, in the minds of their peoples, with the corrupt and repressive governments they hated. Thus, while our aid in some respects bought us time, it bought us little else. The chain of containment and resistance we tried to forge around the Sino-Soviet bloc is near breaking at several points because of critical weaknesses *within* the countries concerned.

These weaknesses were recognized by President Kennedy in his foreign aid message to the Congress last March. Military and defense support programs, he said, should be separated, both financially and administratively, from economic aid. Economic aid programs should aim primarily at assisting underdeveloped countries to develop the capacity for self-sustained growth. Such programs will of necessity call for long-term plans and programs by the recipient countries calculated to achieve this objective. US aid, together with that of its allies, will be adjusted to supply that part of the resources required which the recipient countries – *making a maximum effort of their own* – cannot provide. Aid commitments to the support of such long-term programs cannot be on a year-to-year basis, but must assure the continuity of the aid required over the life span of such programs. The terms of aid must be sufficiently easy, as to the length of our loans, low interest rates and, if need be, grants, to fit the needs and circumstances of the countries assisted.

So far, so good. The Kennedy program goes a long way toward correcting the weaknesses of the past. And while Congressional anxiety has centered mostly on the long-term financing authority needed to undertake long-term aid commitments appropriate to long-term development plans, the Kennedy program strikes also a particularly essential and welcome note in stressing the need for maximum self-help, the nature and significance of which have been spelled out by J. K. Galbraith in an article in *Foreign Affairs* last April, "A Positive Approach to Foreign Aid."

Galbraith maintains that much of our aid in recent years has been disappointing, "even negative," in its results because it has been based on "a convenient but largely erroneous" belief that the missing element required by underdeveloped countries is capital. (Liberals think that "if results are not satisfactory, it is because we are not spending enough. . . . The normal liberal formula for improving foreign aid is to spend about 25 percent more.") But capital, says Galbraith, is not enough. "At least four other things are crucial." One is education – a substantial degree of literacy and an edu-

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cated elite of substantial size. Another is a substantial measure of social justice – "if the ordinary individual receives no share in the advance, he will make no willing contribution to it." Others are "a reliable apparatus of government and public administration" and "a clear and purposeful view of what development involves." Each of these, he maintains, "is as critical as capital." "The only successful development will be that which supplies the missing elements." This, he argues, is what our foreign aid policy and programs should be designed to do.

Although Galbraith fails, in appraising the effects of our aid programs in the 1950's, to give due weight to the deleterious results of their primary emphasis on military and Cold War considerations, and over-states the case for his "prerequisites," he is right in asserting that capital alone is not enough to ensure successful economic development. And one does not need to stretch Galbraith's conditions very far to embrace within their scope such self-help as is implicit in honest, dedicated and determined leadership, realistic economic policies and maximum efforts at resource mobilization. Such self-help on the part of our intended "partners in progress" in Asia, Africa and Latin America, together with the President's new proposals for changes in our own objectives and techniques, would meet our needs and opportunities squarely. But it is precisely here that the really implacable problem is encountered. How will the US persuade the countries concerned to undertake adequate self-help measures? To this question the Administration does not yet appear to have an answer.

Carrot and Stick

The specific actions which the Administration's approach would require will vary from country to country. In many, it would require the leadership substantially to improve its own quality or seriously to invade the power, prestige and economic well-being of the privileged few who control or live off the government. (In others it would require governments which have swung unwisely and too far in the other direction to modify impractical reforms and policies and exhibit greater realism and readiness to contribute more substantially to their own needs.) In Iran, for example, it would require, among other things, a thorough reform of the feudal land holding system, the elimination of corruption in government and willingness on the part of the Shah to reign rather than to rule. In South Vietnam it would require restrictions on the near dictatorial authority of President Diem and the elimination of his relatives and friends from positions of influence and power which have contributed so considerably to widespread corruption and disaffection. In a country like Indonesia, on the other hand, where reformist and welfare ideas have run wild at the expense of self-discipline, constructive policies and reasonable self-help, quite another set of measures would be required. In almost every case, however, the actions needed threaten more than personal privilege, power and pride.

The Kennedy Administration has said that it would urge and assist all nations seeking development aid to prepare appropriate long-term plans and programs. Our aid is to be the carrot which will induce them to help themselves, and which will justify our continued and expanded aid. The withholding of all but minimal aid is presumably to be the stick which will compel them to do what we think they should. But this is far from convincing, for it is extremely doubtful whether such a carrot or stick will persuade or compel even those countries which depend on US aid for a major part of their governmental revenues so radically to mend their ways. The suspicion that this is so may explain in part the Administration's rather plaintive admission to the Congress that it will require at least the 1961-62 fiscal year to come up with specific new programs for the countries to be assisted. Only in the case of a very few, India, for example, does the Administration seem confident that substantial assistance can now be given.

This suspicion perhaps also helps explain the Administration's vague reference to the need to support those groups in underdeveloped countries most likely to contribute constructively to development progress. It is easy to refer gingerly to the possibility that, "with skillful diplomacy, we may be able by our aid to give encouragement to those groups in government which would like to press forward with economic and social reform measures to promote growth." It is, however, quite another matter for the official representatives of the United States in such countries actively to play internal politics, which is what this vague suggestion, if it is to mean anything at all, must mean.

The lengths – in fact the dangerous errors – to which efforts to resolve this problem could easily lead are all too clearly revealed in the ideas which Galbraith, in the article previously cited, has put forward. Galbraith's "Positive Development Plan" envisages the creation of a new US aid agency, which might be called the National Development Institute. This Institute would help countries establish reasonable targets and formulate programs for reaching them. The Institute would also assist the countries actually to carry out their plans, helping at the same time "to develop the permanent administration required."

Participation by the underdeveloped countries would be voluntary. Planning would be done partly in Washington, partly in the recipient country, by a joint Development Authority. The aims would embrace improvements in literacy and income distribution (jus-

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tice), as well as in national income, and would provide for an adequate amount of self-help. If the plan thus worked out is accepted, the joint team – the Planning and Development Authority – would remain in the recipient country and would carry on in effect as a Development Ministry in charge of plan execution. "Existing government agencies which have development responsibilities – in education, industrial development, agriculture, internal revenue – will become subject to its over-all directions."

Super-Cabinet

I do not know how seriously the Administration is considering some such proposal as Galbraith's. I am convinced, however, that the proposal is completely unrealistic. It becomes no more realistic just because Galbraith acknowledges that it "will seem an invasion of sovereignty" to the countries concerned.

This is perhaps his one understatement. Not only would such a proposal "seem" – it definitely would be such an invasion, and it is difficult to believe that even a country dependent on US aid for a major part of its finances would have any part of it. This reaction would not be mitigated by Galbraith's references to our good intentions, the designation of local people as chairmen of the development authorities, the gradual replacement of the US members, the presence of UN observers or the revocable nature of the arrangements proposed. For what Galbraith has unwittingly suggested is nothing less than the creation of a super-cabinet, presumably not subject even to parliamentary or electoral control, on which Americans would sit as half the membership!

I say "unwittingly," because I cannot conceive that such a proposal would consciously be made – but it seems unmistakably clear to me that a Development Ministry which had power to *direct* all "existing government agencies which have development responsibilities" would of necessity be a super-cabinet. It is not as though development were being considered only in a narrow sense as an investment exercise. It is being considered as a process involving basic social and economic reforms, the reorganization of public administration, the mobilization of financial, manpower and other resources, the determination of fiscal, monetary, credit, tariff, trade, wage and other economic policies – in short, as embracing the marshaling, direction and control of a nation's energies in such a manner as to transform its production apparatus, the economic relations among individuals and groups and the attitudes and values by which they live. Countries whether dedicated to democratic processes or not would hesitate to delegate such powers to a cabinet of their own choosing. How could they agree to delegate them to an all-powerful "Development Ministry" in which power would be shared equally with representatives of the US?

It does not help, in this connection, that the development plan as envisaged by Galbraith would first be adopted by the government concerned, so that the jointly manned Development Ministry would "only" execute an already accepted plan. No plan could make specific advance provisions for implementing all the general objectives, principles, programs and policies laid down in it. Questions of alternative means and degrees of emphasis, timing, enforcement, etc., would still have to be resolved by the executive authority, and would involve issues as basic, in practical terms, as the plan provisions themselves.

It is interesting, too, to speculate on the kinds of personnel who might be designated by the joint parties to membership on an authority with such awesome powers. Presumably the US designees would be of no higher level than represent us today as USOM (ICA) mission chiefs abroad. With whom would they sit on these authorities – prime ministers and senior ministers? Senior civil servants? Private individuals? It is inconceivable that the top leadership of a country – politics, prestige and protocol being what they are – would sit with such an American group, or that they would delegate to lesser officials the authority to join with US representatives in directing the nation's affairs.

No. The Galbraith proposals for administering a new "positive approach" to foreign aid cannot seriously be entertained, and it would be little short of calamitous to propose any such arrangement to the countries we wish to help. Fortunately, the Administration has as yet given no indication that it intends to do so. It apparently intends rather to provide massive aid to India as perhaps the one major underdeveloped country which can meet the new criteria, and to do the best it can with others. In other words, if countries like Iran and Vietnam won't play the new game, they will continue to be paid off, on perhaps a somewhat smaller scale, on the basis of the old one.

At this point the brave new foreign aid program begins to look very much like the old, expedient losing game. And it is this critical weakness which explains the lukewarm reactions to the President's proposals of some of foreign aid's oldest and strongest past supporters on the Hill.

Is there no better way? And, if no completely satisfactory solution can be found, can we not find some better one than this? As I see it, what we are looking for is a solution capable of doing three simultaneous jobs. It should enable us to assist in the preparation of the kinds of development plans and programs needed; it should enable us to bring pressure to bear on the countries concerned to maximize their own contributions to their development efforts, without undue resentment on their part; and it should enable us to max-

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imize and coordinate the aid contributions of other Western nations. I can see one possible institutional arrangement through which all three of these purposes might be served with reasonable effectiveness.

In the economic development field, the World Bank has greater prestige, know-how and acceptance among the underdeveloped nations than has any other institution. Its multilateral and non-political identification, and the serious interest it has shown in the development programs of the countries in which it has made project loans, contribute to this prestige, know-how and acceptance. If the Bank were to place resident missions in the underdeveloped countries, the Bank could help them to formulate appropriate plans, appraise their own potential self-help efforts and residual needs for external aid, act in effect as the coordinator for all Western aid (including, of course, its own), advise and assist the recipient countries in carrying out their programs and, for their own benefit as well as that of the contributing countries, evaluate their progress.

Such an assignment, which I suspect President Black would not welcome, would not of course preclude other or supplementary arrangements which individual recipient countries might prefer, or which the Bank itself might wish to arrange, to help it shoulder so heavy a load. United Nations, university, foundation and private consultants' teams, requested by and working directly for the recipient countries, could play an important auxiliary and cooperative role. The Bank arrangement, however, would serve as the general nucleus of the working solution needed. Recommendations which, coming from the US (or any great power), would smack of attempted domination, could, in the case of the Bank, be accepted – or considered – as technical and businesslike. And, of course, the fact that the Bank's judgments would greatly influence the volume and direction of most Western economic aid would give tremendous leverage to the Bank's recommendations. This, it seems to me, is a more practicable idea than any which I have yet seen.

A Responsible Distribution of the World's Wealth

What is happening in the international economy today is an approximate repetition of the course followed by each of the present industrial countries, internally, during the last 200 years. Minorities accumulated the scant wealth produced by whole societies. Minorities cultivated the arts and the incipient technology. More than social injustice there was, perhaps, lack of knowledge, and the work of the nation had a low yield. As the means to produce abundance were developed, there came, by coincidence or by necessity, the social forces that imposed a wider distribution of national income. This benefited the majorities directly. And as a consequence internal markets were enlarged, bringing about the present inducement to an ever-larger production. The drama is now being re-enacted, not in the relations between rich minorities within the advanced societies, but in the economic intercourse between the few enriched and the many "proletarian" peoples of today. . . . For example, savings and capital accumulation were relatively easy in Europe and the United States at a time when social aspirations had not been awakened, and when the tendency to consume was held in check by the political power of the well-to-do minorities. Today, the retarded countries that are trying to adopt or maintain democracy, have to cope with modern social pressures, exerted by the growing power of the majorities. Consumers are also voters, and this makes the national sacrifices [involved in] capital formation difficult. . . . To such internal difficulties of capital formation in the underdeveloped democracies, one has to add the new international facts of economic life. Most of the poor countries (certainly all of the Latin American Republics) depend to a great extent on their primary exports, and experience a growing tendency to consume industrial imports. In this relatively intense external trade, they pay prices that represent the higher standards of the advanced countries, and in exchange they receive prices that reflect their own modest living. Buying dear and selling cheap in the world market does not make savings and capitalization easy for the "proletarian" nations of today. . . . When outside capital is invested in these countries, the lack of knowledge of international economics (more than a deliberate "imperialism") allows investments to work as suction pumps, siphoning off most of the new capital created, into the investing countries. . . . The prophecy of Karl Marx, whereby the proletariat of the industrial nations would become relatively poorer as time went on, has not been realized because of the countervailing power acquired by the majorities in our contemporary democracies. However, in the international field, the prophecy may yet hold true. The only way to avoid a relative worsening of conditions in the underdeveloped world is to establish political and ethical checks on the power of the ruling classes, and to regulate international commerce. – *From a paper submitted by José Figueres and Adolf Berle, Jr. to the Second Inter-American Conference for Democracy and Freedom, Caracas, April, 1960*

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Hemingway: The Conquest of Panic

by Irving Howe

Now that he is dead and nothing remains but a few books and the problem of his dying, perhaps we should ask the simplest, most radical of questions: what was there in Hemingway's writing that enabled him to command the loyalty of a generation? Even those of us who disliked some of his work and most of his posture, why did we too feel compelled to acknowledge the strength and resonance of his voice?

Answering such questions can never be easy, and with Hemingway, master that he is of false leads and distracting personnae, it demands a touch of ruthlessness. The usual business of literary criticism will yield only limited returns, for if you were to spend the next decade studying the narrative techniques of his stories you would still be far from the sources of his power. Most of his late work was bad, Papa gone soft, desperately in search of the image of self he had made in his youth. *The Old Man and the Sea* – a confection of synthetic wisdom, an exercise in pidgin-classicism, a parody of composure and lilt. *Across the River and Into the Trees* – the swagger of a failing conqueror, all garrulous and fantasy, but as a personal revelation unbearably sad, the pose crumbling, the terror of getting old finally breaking past his guard.

For the past twenty years the public Hemingway, who cannot after all be so readily separated from Hemingway, was a tiresome man. The old African hunter, the connoisseur of bulls, women and wars, the experience-dropper, was a show-off who had stopped watching the audience to see if it remained interested. Nothing more cruel has happened to an American writer than the Lillian Ross interview in a 1950 *New Yorker:* a smear of vanity and petulence that only a journalistic Delilah would have put into print. Miss Ross, a few days ago, wrote in anger to say that Hemingway had approved her article, and one believes her implicitly. That is just the trouble. Years earlier Hemingway had written, "Something happens to our good writers at a certain age. . . ." Yes; they devote the first half of their lives to imitating human experience and the second to parodying their imitation.

But there was another Hemingway. He was always a young writer, and always a writer for the young. He published his best novel *The Sun Also Rises* in his mid-twenties and completed most of his great stories by the age of forty. He started a campaign of terror against the fixed vocabulary of literature, a purge of style and pomp, and in the name of naturalness he modelled a new artifice for tension. He was a short-breathed writer, whether in the novel or story. He struck past the barriers of culture and seemed to disregard the reticence of civilized relationships. He wrote for the nerves.

In his very first stories Hemingway struck straight to the heart of our nihilism, writing with that marvellous courage he then had, which allowed him to brush past received ideas and show Nick Adams alone, bewildered, afraid and bored, Nick Adams finding his bit of peace through fishing with an exact salvaging ritual in the big two-hearted river. Hemingway struck straight to the heart of our nihilism through stories about people who have come to the end of the line, who no longer know what to do or where to turn: nihilism not as an idea or a sentiment, but as an encompassing condition of moral disarray in which one has lost those tacit impulsions which permit life to continue and suddenly begins to ask questions that would better be left unasked. There is a truth which makes our faith in human existence seem absurd, and no one need contemplate it for very long: Hemingway, in his early writing, did. Nick Adams, Jake Barnes, Lady Brett, Frederick Henry, and then the prizefighters, matadors, rich Americans and failed writers: all are at the edge, almost ready to surrender and be done with it, yet holding on to whatever fragment of morale, whatever scrap of honor, they can. Theirs is the heroism of people who have long ago given up the idea of being heroic and wish only to get by without being too messy.

It has been said that Hemingway, obsessed with the problem of fear, sought in his fiction for strategies to overcome it; and that is true, but only partly so. Hemingway was not so foolish as to suppose that fear can finally be overcome: all his best stories, from "Fifty Grand" to "The Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber" are concerned to improvise a momentary truce in the hopeless encounter with fear. Hemingway touched upon something deeper, something that broke forth in his fiction as the most personal and lonely kind of experience but was formed by the pressure of 20th Century history. His great subject, I think, was panic, the panic that follows, so to speak, upon the dissolution of nihilism into the blood-stream of consciousness, the panic that finds unbearable the thought of the next minute and its succession by the minute after that. And we all know this experience, even if, unlike Jake Barnes, we can sleep at night: we know it because it is part of modern

Summer Schedule

During the summer months, *The New Republic* will not appear on the following dates:

July 17 July 31
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life, perhaps of any life, but also because Hemingway drove it fearlessly into our awareness.

But there was more. Hemingway's early fiction made his readers turn in upon themselves with the pain of measurement and consider the question of their sufficiency as men. He touched the quick of our anxieties, and for the moment of his excellence he stood ready to face whatever he saw. The compulsive stylization of his prose was a way of letting the language tense and retense, group and regroup, while beneath it the panic that had taken hold of the characters and then of the reader kept spreading inexorably. The prose served both as barrier and principle of contrast to that shapelessness which is panic by definition, and through its very tautness allowed the reader finally to establish some distance and then perhaps compassion.

This Hemingway forced us to ask whether as men we had retained any thrust and will, any unbreakable pride. He asked this question in the most fundamental sexual way, moving from the desperateness of *The Sun Also Rises* to the comforts but also final return to bleakness in *Farewell to Arms*, from the sleeping-bag fantasia – with Maria as a sort of Fayaway with politics – of *For Whom the Bell Tolls* to the boozy ruminations of *Across the River and Into the Trees*. But he also asked the question in other ways.

The poet John Berryman once said that we live in a culture where a man can go through his entire life without having once to discover whether he is a coward. Hemingway forced his readers to consider such possibilities, and through the clenched shape of his stories he kept insisting that no one can escape, moments of truth come to all of us. Fatalistic as they often seem, immersed in images of violence and death, his stories are actually incitements to personal resistance and renewal. Reading them, one felt stirred to a stronger sense – if not of one's possible freedom – then at least of one's possible endurance and companionship in stoicism.

Hemingway's vision was narrow. It was, as an Italian critic has remarked, "a brilliant half-vision of life," in which a whole range of behavior, not least of all the behavior of man thinking, was left out. But there were moments when he wrote with a sudden enlarged sensibility, so that one forgot the limits of his stance and style, feeling that here, for these few pages, one was in the presence of a great writer. There is a little story called "A Clean Well-Lighted Place" and a passage in that story where the older waiter explains to the younger one that he must be patient with the homeless men sitting in the café, because everyone needs a clean well-lighted place in which to stare at his aloneness. I cannot imagine that this story will ever be forgotten.

The General's Lieutenant-in-Command

by Sidney Hyman

In 1955, Sherman Adams received a birthday note from a White House colleague comparing him affectionately to a certain "cold boiled Bostonian" of the Adams clan who had "a soul of granite through which ran fine flaws of humanity." Three years later, when the ambiguous humanity of the Goldfine flaws made a political casualty of the granite, Mr. Adams resigned from the White House place he had held for six years as *The* Assistant to President Eisenhower.

First Hand Report
by Sherman Adams
(Harper; $5.95)

Now, in *First Hand Report*, Mr. Adams writes of what he saw, heard and did as an Eisenhower intimate from 1952 to 1958. The effect is a sunburst of light on many things – on the 1952 Eisenhower bid for the Presidency, what the man was like in the White House, how the Eisenhower staff worked, how a Presidency was improvised during the President's illnesses, the central aims of Mr. Eisenhower, and the circumstances surrounding some of the salient policy decisions made between 1952 and 1958.

All this and more, is set down in lean and muscular prose that carries Mr. Adams' narrative line forward at a scherzo clip. In none of this – though he has his hierarchy of likes and dislikes among the pantheon of men who formed his White House world – does he allow the hurt of his own exit from that world to distort his general perspective. He is a model of taste, never embarrassing, self-effacing, wrily humorous about himself, laconic about the "great corporation Presidents" who filled every pause in the White House conversations "with their theories and anecdotes" – and, with good reason, an angry man only when dealing with "the conservative Republicans."

Indeed, the very merit of Mr. Adam's book only serves to heighten the mystery about Mr. Adams' Washington style when he seemed so often to be an unhibited rage type – and the further mystery of his friendship with Mr. Goldfine. Was that style but a show of toughness contrived as a theatrical mask for a painfully shy, honest New England soul? And was that same shyness the real reason why he was attracted, by force of contrast, to the free-wheeling Bernard Goldfine – while Mr. Adams' personal honesty blinded him to the way others could see an irregular connection between Mr. Goldfine's gifts and the routine calls to government agencies for information made on his behalf?

While these questions continue to hang in unresolved suspense over this book, it should be added that the ring of truth that sounds throughout what Mr. Adams has written, sounds primarily through the narrative line itself, more than it does from a writer who stops and says to the reader: "Now that I have set forth the facts, let me reflect directly on what the facts mean to me." It seems fair to guess that Mr. Adams is still too much the loyal lieutenant of President Eisenhower to do anything of the sort – because full scale, direct reflections, would be to underline explicitly the massive contradictions of the President he served with total devotion.

Two particular contradictions deserve special mention before other things are commented upon.

The first concerns the President's rela-

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tionship with the "conservative Republicans" in the Congress, and their counterparts in control of the Republican National Committee. At every turn in Mr. Adams' account they appear to have multiplied woes for Mr. Eisenhower – while Eisenhower also saw that he had to rely on Democratic votes to get through the Congress any part of his national security program. Yet in every parallel sentence, Mr. Eisenhower is seen in the act of expressing his distaste for the work of party leadership – and hence his personal disinterest in tackling the arduous task of recasting the Republican party along liberal lines, as FDR recast the Democratic party he inherited in 1932.

In the end, Mr. Adams himself was caught and cut down by this same contradiction. Immediately before his involvement in the affairs of Bernard Goldfine became known, he ventured to set himself right with the conservative Republicans by mounting a rip-snorting political attack on the Congressional Democrats – whose votes were needed to put through the President's national security program. The Democrats later had their revenge when the Goldfine affair erupted in the headlines, but as Mr. Adams tells the story, it was not they who really plunged the knife into his ribs. The knife handle was held by the conservative Republicans.

They were still bitter over the role Adams had played in helping General Eisenhower win the 1952 Republican Presidential nomination away from Senator Robert Taft. More than that, they blamed him for the fact that Mr. Eisenhower, as President, had failed to adhere to the line of Republican orthodoxy in the matter of cutting back on federal expenditures, and hence, in cutting back on tax levies. They therefore let it be known that unless Adams was sent packing, they would not make their usual contributions to the forthcoming Congressional campaign. Nor did Mr. Eisenhower, despite his moving cry about Mr. Adams – "I need him" – stand up to this pressure. In the name of letting Mr. Adams decide on his own course to resign, he capitulated to the conservative Republicans – as Mr. Adams himself had done at the very start of the story on the celebrated occasion when he joined in urging General Eisenhower to delete a complimentary reference to General George C. Marshall from the 1952 campaign speech scheduled for Joseph McCarthy's Wisconsin.

A second contradiction is equally striking. Mr. Adams tells in illuminating detail of how Eisenhower carried off what he regards as his greatest achievement – the balancing of the budget. In equally illuminating detail, he tells of Mr. Eisenhower's search for peace in the world arena – and how peace proved so elusive. Nowhere, however, does Mr. Adams indicate directly that there might have been an inherent contradiction between these two efforts – that in the drive for a balanced budget, President Eisenhower may have denied to himself and the nation the full array of tools he needed to press his search for peace with greater success. More and more, as Russian power increased, the chief tool Mr. Eisenhower had to fall back on was his own prestige in the world – yet this purely personal attribute was not the kind of national power before which the Russians would give ground.

All this to one side, there is much else in Mr. Adams' story that is worth pondering. Chief among these is the question of how to run the Presidential Office. If I read Mr. Adams account correctly, save for the time when Mr. Eisenhower was bedridden, the commander-in-chief of his Administration was not Secretary of State Dulles, Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey, nor even Mr. Adams. Rather it was President Eisenhower himself. He laid down the ground rules and made the major policy decisions within which the whole of his White House staff and Cabinet moved. When then did the contrary appear to be the case?

The implied answer seems to be this: As between the kind of criticism he would invite for not appearing to be in charge of his Administration, and the kind of criticism he would risk if he visibly lead from the front – and some things went wrong – Mr. Eisenhower, as a former Supreme Commander, saw that the former criticism was easier to negotiate than the latter. The country itself was in a mood to follow an anti-politics sort of politics, whereby he, as Supreme Commander, could remain a remote figure held in reserve only to deal with critical emergencies. On the other hand, since some work had to go forward, it was best to let his field commanders seem to be in charge of the public business. They could always be sacked if things went dangerously wrong, or in any case, they could draw down on their own heads all counter-battery fire while he remained immune from attack.

If it took men of special temperament to fit into this scheme of things – and especially, a man of self sacrificial spirit to preside over the whole of it – there is nothing inherently wrong in the arrangement. Within the four corners of the law, a President has a right to use his subordinates in any way he sees fit. But the rest of us have a right of our own – which was discharged in only a desultory way during the Eisenhower years. Regardless of who seems to make the organic decisions of an Administration, the rest of us have a right to hold the President personally to a primary account for whatever the result was. For example, it never made any sense for anyone to train his fire on Mr. Adams in the pre-Goldfine days, saying

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that he was "usurping power" or was "keeping people from seeing the President," or was making decisions behind the President's back. The arrangement that placed Mr. Adams at the control switch on Mr. Eisenhower's line of vision was an arrangement whose one and sole author was Mr. Eisenhower personally, and it was Mr. Eisenhower personally who was accountable for the results it all led to.

We are reminded that Mr. Kennedy, by contrast, has seen fit to assume full Constitutional responsibility for the acts of his subordinates or for the decisions he reaches on their advice. This may lead to unpleasant embarrassments, as in the Cuban fiasco. It would have been more convenient to "fire someone" as was suggested at the time, so that Mr. Kennedy's personal flag would fly unsullied by as much as a speck. Yet he is too forthright a man, and too strict a constitutionalist, to hide behind his subordinates. And he also recognizes that a President has a "teaching function" which can be discharged only when the President speaks directly to the nation in his own voice, sharing directly with the nation the intensity of its own experiences. One can only guess that Mr. Adams would have liked to serve under this kind of President, for all the praise he has for the man under whom he did in fact serve so well.

When Franco Defeated Spain

by Daniel M. Friedenberg

Every few years a "final" and "definitive" study is published of the Spanish Civil War. First on the list was Franz Borkenau, followed by Salvador de Madariaga, who in turn was succeeded by Gerald Brenan. Now another contender enters the ring, the Englishman Hugh Thomas, whose *The Spanish Civil War* has just been published here after a brilliant reception in England.

The Spanish Civil War
by Hugh Thomas
(Harper; $8.50)

The continued interest in the Spanish Civil War is itself indicative. Like the bullfight, this war has its *aficionados* who pursue each new book with unflagging zeal, trying to decipher the riddle of the death of Loyalist Spain. For the Spanish Civil War was the first and purest of the "new wars," the ideological conflicts devolving from the collision of Marxist thought with tradition forces. And at the time, it all seemed so simple and clear. On one hand were grouped the Army, Church, landed aristocrats and big capitalists. On the other hand were the workers, intelligentsia and more enlightened members of the middle class. The fact that the politics of the Spanish Republic between 1931 and 1936 tended to force this situation, and polarize what was in many respects an unnatural alignment serving chaos and civil war, was conveniently forgotten in the same way partisans of Cuba today tend to ignore the deliberate refusal of Castro to make any accommodation with the US in his first year of power.

Hugh Thomas has attempted to be the Edward Gibbon of the Spanish Civil War, the enlightened conservative who has risen above the passion and the blood to see the conflict as the ages will see it. He tries to portray events with absolute objectivity in accordance with what are called "bourgeois" standards; *i.e.* the facts speaking for themselves and not as propaganda for a specific view. It is a fundamental question whether this method, or indeed any other, can be applied to history. Facts are at best facts. Whether catalogued by an alert conservative, a believer in Fascism or a Marxian determinist, they have a shocking habit of making most "unscientific" turns just when best nailed to a certain ideology. But one advantage of men like Hugh Thomas is that they write well, for their intent is to divert as well as instruct.

The Spanish Civil War has a Gibbonesque literary quality. Its 700 pages teem with such ironic and illuminating comments as these: On Dolores Ibarruri, "La Pasionaria," the most notable Spanish Communist:

> "Always dressed in black, with a grave but fanatical face which caused the masses who listened to her platform speeches to suppose her a kind of revolutionary saint, she was now about thirty-five. Years before, as a girl, she had been a devout Catholic. In those days, she had wandered from village to village in the Basque provinces, selling sardines from a great tray which she bore on her head. But Dolores la Sardinera married a miner from Asturias, one of the obscure founders of the Communist party in northern Spain. She transferred her devotion from Our Lady of Begoña to the prophet of the British Museum Reading Room."

On Primo de Rivera, the Spanish dictator preceding Franco:

> "'And now,' he remarked in the last of his famous communiqués, 'and now for a little rest, after 2,326 days of continuous uneasiness, responsibility and labour'. He left Spain and died a few months later in a second class hotel in the Rue du Bac in Paris, his last hours divided between brothel and confessional."

On the Spanish officer mentality:

> "The average Spanish officer after all was by middle age dissatisfied, irritable and right wing. . . . In Spain, as elsewhere, the young officer, when still supported by family money, is generally happy. He is happy too, while his uniforms and handsome figure can still dazzle the marriageable girls of his family's acquaintance. There follows a short engagement, promotion to captain, marriage. There are mounting expenses, appearances have to be kept up, but pay remains low. The military zeal of youth departs. The high-spirited lion of the ballroom becomes an embittered employee of the state. His wife is worn by the exigencies of incessant economising. She points enviously at her husband's once scorned civilian con-

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temporaries. . . . [But] the officer could dream of a *coup d'etat*, which would place him in a position superior to his clever liberal and commercial friends."

It almost appears at times as though Hugh Thomas were editing a gossip column on the Spanish Civil War. He makes a point of including sensational tidbits, especially those dealing with sex, even though founded solely on rumor. As a solid Englishman, he illustrates a classic admiration for the martial qualities of Germans, disdain toward Slavs and contempt for Italians. A certain superior Anglo-Saxon loftiness hovers over the work. "After all, these are Spaniards, Latins, Papists," one imagines Mr. Thomas remark to himself as he scrawls off lines of pungent irony.

More seriously, there are many factual mistakes, though it must be admitted that such a massive book could not be totally devoid of error. Salvador de Madariaga is included in the famous "Generation of '98" though he was only twelve years old at the time. Spanish difference is traced "from her slow development as a nation," though Spain was one of the earliest European national states. And we are referred to the "absolutism of the Bourbons" whereas the Bourbons were the liberal monarchic strain in Hispanic history.

Worst of all, much of the source material is of dubious origin. Hugh Thomas draws with opaque impartiality not only from the writings of Nazi and Fascist propagandists, but also the official Falange apologists. This is like trying to throw light on Jewish history by quoting Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. Already an erratum slip has been attached to advance copies in order to correct a slanderous assertion the author included as fact.

The most original material discussed in *The Spanish Civil War* (presuming we can believe it) deals with the movement of leftists from all over Europe to save Madrid in November of 1937. The first International Brigade consisted initially of less than 2,000 men. The lead battalion, composed mainly of Germans, was commanded by an ex-Prussian Colonel, Hans Kahle. The second battalion, made up of French and Germans, was led by Colonel Dumont, also an ex-regular officer. The two military men had faced each other more than twenty years earlier on the Western Front and now, as convinced Communists, were fighting together under the leadership of General Emilio Kléber, born Lazar Stern in Hungary. One-third of this first International Brigade was dead two days after taking their vow not to yield the line before the smashing Nationalist attack – which, incidentally, was dominated by troops from Morocco. Madrid, the capital of most Catholic Spain, was being attacked by Moslems and defended by atheists. This was only one of the mockeries of the Spanish Civil War.

The men involved with the work of the International Brigades later became the cream of Communist leadership. Among them were included the German Ulbricht, the Yugoslav Tito, the Czech Gottwald, the Bulgarian Dimitrov, the Italians Togliatti and Luigi Longo, the Frenchmen André Marty, Thorez and Louis Aragon, and the Russian "volunteers," Konev, Malinovsky, the tank General Pavlov and the future Rokossovsky. Non-Communists also rallied to the cause, many being fellow travellers at the time. André Malraux, "the Byron of the age," led a French air squadron. Our own Louis Fischer was Quarter-Master General. W. H. Auden worked with an ambulance unit. The wild nephew of Winston Churchill, Esmond Romilly, learned the trade which led to his death as a bomber pilot in the Battle of Britain. It was a great time to be alive – and an excellent time to die – if one believed in the Beauteous Vision of the Coming Proletarian Society.

Since the Spanish Civil War, an intelligent and informed opinion has developed about the meaning of this conflict. *The Spanish Labyrinth* of Gerald Brenan most clearly put the position of sympathetic but non-Communist liberals. Thomas in general agrees with Brenan though he is more abstracted from any emotional ties with the Loyalists. Briefly, this is Brenan's position:

1. The liberal regime which replaced the monarchy in 1931 was a bridge loosely connecting two widely different Spains – the Right Wing of the Army, landlords and Church; and the Left Wing of the radical bourgeoisie, the Socialists and anarchists. The anarchists were against representative democracy on principle. And the split in the Socialist party between reform and revolutionary groups made civil war almost inevitable by impelling the uncommitted Center toward the Right.

2. By embarking on extreme anticlerical measures instead of emphasizing agrarian reform (which most Spaniards accepted), the Republic alienated the fervent Catholics and most of the middle class that normally supports progressive policies in feudal lands. When the Socialist party, under the impetus of Largo Caballero, officially adopted a revolutionary Marxian platform, the alienation of the rest of the middle class was completed.

3. The real factor behind these shifts was the Great Depression. Widespread unemployment and business failures strengthened the power of extremists and weakened the moderates. To hold the allegiance of the starving workers, the Socialists had to move steadily to the totalitarian left and, reacting to this, the middle class definitely allied itself with the totalitarian right.

4. By the time of the outbreak of war, the middle-class government leaders were mere figureheads, propped up by the revolutionary parties in hope that England and France might consider them less dangerous. At first the anarchists and Socialists were in control; then, backed by the Soviet Union, the Communists took over the dominant role under the "neutral" Negrín. This was a logical outcome of the fact that Russia alone supplied machines of war to the Republicans. Under the farce of Non-Intervention, German and Italian aid flowed to Franco with complete impunity while England, France and America refused arms to the legal gov-

"WHY SHOULDN'T THE *United States call upon the United Nations to take up the matter of Berlin as a threat to international peace? And having got the Assembly together, why shouldn't Kennedy and his team go to work on the delegates—as diligently and profitably as though they were delegates at a Democratic Convention—clubbing them with their own clichés about democracy and self-rule, and force a vote (it could be done) calling for free elections in the entire city?*"

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ernment. The war thus became not a Spanish Civil War but an international war fought on Spanish soil, with the leadership on each side being to a large extent controlled by foreigners for their own un-Spanish interests.

5. If the Republicans had won, there is little doubt that there would have been another civil war shortly thereafter, pitting the reform Socialists and anarchists against the revolutionaries tied to the Soviet Union. Since the Communists had already infiltrated the major civilian posts and controlled the Army (aside from General Miaja), the evidence leads one to believe that the Spanish Communists would have been the victor. Already by late 1937, the Russian-controlled International Brigades, Russian aircraft and Spanish Communist generals effectively led the Loyalist armies and dictated policy – usually to the good of the war effort, it may be added. They destroyed the anarchist opposition (really the majority party) of Barcelona, overturned from power Largo Caballero, the leading Socialist, and engineered with complete impunity the murder of the Trotskyite leader, Andrés Nin.

The prime weakness of Hugh Thomas' *The Spanish Civil War* is the use of Falange, Fascist, Nazi and dissident Communist records, some of them known forgeries, to build up a "balanced" view of the conflict. At the end the strife becomes merely historical and we ask ourselves: was this what it was about? Why did the war arouse such passion after all? In a small footnote, Mr. Thomas describes the meeting of the Spanish Ambassador and Léon Blum in Paris. The French Premier had just been forced to accept non-intervention due to British pressure. "De los Ríos convinced Blum with a burningly eloquent description of the young militiamen fighting Fascism in the sierras. Blum buried his face in his hands and wept. De los Ríos did the same. The interview ended like that."

A brief note, yes, but it tells us more of the human emotions aroused on the part of decent people everywhere than reams of witty comments from the diary of Count Ciano or the apologetics of the Falange White Papers.

We are still too near the Spanish Civil War even to accept objectivity, since the business there done is not yet ended. Many of us grew to political consciousness in that epoch. Some of us had friends who died fighting in the Iberian wasteland. And General Franco, with his Portuguese counterpart who aided him so stoutly, are alive and still doing mischief: witness the horror of Angola today. We cannot say a plague on both your houses, as did such intellectuals as José Ortega y Gasset, Salvador de Madariaga, Dr. Gregorio Marañón, Pío Baroja and Ramón Menendez Pidal; we have seen the house Franco built and we know of its wretched and frustrated tenants.

As Dionisio Ridruejo, a former Falangist, recently wrote, the two Spains which faced each other in 1936 were numerically equal, while today the official government only represents a minority. The victory of Franco has been the defeat of Spain, as the next generation shall prove.

In the Shadow of His Excellency

by Patrick O'Donovan

Mr. O'Connor, as a fair part of the Western World knows, has dealt with the American Irish before.

In *The Last Hurrah*, he wrote of them within the setting of a recognizable city and as part of a greater society. It was an exhilarating, liberating, lusty sort of book even though it was strained through the first person singular of a rather dim and ill-defined intellectual. It frankly rejoiced in the antics and achievements of an earlier generation of Irish politicians, in the little, elo-

The Edge of Sadness
by Edwin O'Connor
(Little, Brown; $5)

quent, snappy, derby-hatted, whiskey-on-the-breath-in-the-morning politicians who ruthlessly captured cities for themselves and for their own. Without meaning to do so, it almost justified their existence, almost established that their dishonesties served a social purpose, that they were in effect a sort of private welfare state for the hopeless mass of oppressed immigrants. It was a brilliant explanation, though not really an apologia for their goings-on. But I remember that in one review of it, Anthony West – affronted by the apparent tolerances of political corruption – described it as that rare thing, a genuinely immoral book.

No one could write anything like that of *The Edge of Sadness*. Indeed, it is the sort of book that could be safely and properly read aloud in any refectory, provided only that the fathers there tended to linger over their meals.

The Edge of Sadness is also about the American Irish. But it is about a community that exists wholly on its own. There is no sign of a circumambient non-Catholic Society. The story is about Catholic parishes, alive and dying; they seem all to exist on the edge of a city. The apex of the society is His Excellency – the shadowy bishop. There is no waste of charm or whimsy here. For the most part the men and women are of a restrained or worldly piety. The view is that of a highly organized, practical and narrow religion in action and inaction in a part of a community that has inexplicably got cut off from the world or the idea that it is part of a Universal Church.

If *The Lash Hurrah* was about the Irish clawing their way up out of the political and social pit that they found in their promised land, *The Edge of Sadness* is about their conditions at the top. This is about the confident, arrived Irish, who take money and religion for granted and who can act the snob just as well as any of those Protestants. Maybe, then, this book is a social portent. A foreigner, a non-Catholic stranger, could gather from it either that the Irish have now achieved total confidence or that they have absorbed the rest of America.

The story itself, (which is somehow subordinate to the setting), is about a spiritual triangle. The narrator, a rather dim and defeated man, is pastor of a rundown parish. He is devoted to his priestly rather than his pastoral functions. He is also a reformed whiskey

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priest. He has done his stint in a home for alcoholic clergy and now lives in passive contentment with a dotty curate in a decayed rectory. His congregation is not Irish and tends to be apathetic and hopeless.

Then he has an unexpected encounter with an old friend of his father. This Charlie Carmody is an aged bully, a ruthless and unscrupulous businessman who delights in terrorizing his family. Carmody has a son who is also a priest. The younger Carmody runs an Irish parish and it is busy, rich, successful and alive with healthy transplanted life. But this priest is in deeper gulfs than the ex-whiskey priest. He suffers from a form of priestly despair that I have not met before in The Catholic Novel. He cannot abide his parishioners. And he has grown to hate his father. Both Carmodys want something of the whiskey priest and their getting it and failing to get it is the


JULES FEIFFER
WHEN A COUNTRY IS INVOLVED IN A LIFE AND DEATH STRUGGLE IT CAN'T BE ALL THAT LIBERALS WOULD LIKE IT TO BE.
THAT'S WHAT MOST PEOPLE DON'T UNDERSTAND- FOR INSTANCE, THE PRESS-
EXACTLY! ALL RIGHT, WHEN YOU'RE MORE OR LESS SECURE A PERFECTLY FREE PRESS THAT CAN PRINT ALL THE NEWS IS FINE.
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CERTAINLY! WE ALL WANT TO BE JUST BUT THE MOST DANGEROUS ENEMY IS THE ENEMY FROM WITHIN!
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story. Around the three is a swirl of cronies and parishioners and faintly unhappy relations. And there is a great deal of uncomplicated spiritual introspection as well.

As in all Catholic novels whose purpose is not merely to edify, one is left uncertain who is the sinner before God, who the victim and who the blasphemer. And at the end the whiskey priest is still quietly tending his unfashionable and altogether rather lonely altar. Readers of Evelyn Waugh's *Brideshead* will be surprised to find themselves revisiting such a familiar place by such an unexpected road. There is a reassuring suggestion of seriousness about the book. Its author is well established. The subject is fashionable. It sticks to what is only superficially controversial. It is done with great skill. It has patently taken a great deal of labor to produce. You put it down with a nice sense of having acquired merit by reading it. It is impossible to see how it can fail, but perhaps this is not quite enough. I personally believe that Mr. O'Connor will write a great novel. But either this particularly Irish seam of his is running out, or else he must attack it with new and sharper tools.

MOVIES

Old Wine in New Wineskins

Under the title *Marseilles*, Marcel Pagnol's play *Fanny*, the first of his famous Marseilles trilogy, was produced on Broadway thirty years ago and lasted one week. By some stroke of adolescent good fortune I had the chance to see it three times in that week, and my warm memory of it has since been enhanced by the French films made of the trilogy. These are, by elemental standards, bad pictures; they are merely filmed plays and, as the work proceeds, it becomes less a coherent chronicle of love and paternity and more a series of comedy acts. But what character comedy! Raimu and Charpin as César and Panisse are two small-scale epic figures. Pierre Fresnay was too old for Marius even in 1932, but it seems irrelevant. Surely one of the most endearingly acted scenes on film is the breakfast during which Raimu, eating and tossing olive pits over his shoulder, half-angrily teases his son about his whereabouts on the night before and finally tosses the boy the belt that he left in Fanny's room.

Fanny (Warner)
By Love Possessed (United Artists)

My long-term affection for the trilogy had not blinded me to the fact that condensation would help it, and a condensation was presented on Broadway a few years ago, as a musical; but it was lumpy and pedestrian except for Walter Slezak's Panisse. Now, without the songs but with the same director, we are given a film of the condensation.

Excepting the lovely Leslie Caron, who is by far the best in the title-role of the four I have seen, the picture is small improvement over the condensation and is afflicted with error – relatively subtle but still error. The producers have not been so crass as to use, say, Ernest Borgnine and William Bendix as César and Panisse; more delicately mistaken, they have cast Charles Boyer, an estimable Parisian "boulevard" actor, as the earthy Marseillaise bar-keep, and Maurice Chevalier, a resourceful entertainer but not an actor at all, as the amorous but decent ships' chandler. They have photographed the exteriors in Marseilles in blatant postcard color and have subsequently added the sound-track in a flat "studio" manner that vitiates the actuality. Joshua Logan has directed with his customary semi-understanding and vulgarity-maimed skill.

Miss Caron is emotionally true, and her *gamine* frankness changes quite convincingly to a differing view of honesty as she matures. Boyer seems harried and ill-at-ease and gives one of his rare bad performances; there is no repose, no command in it. Chevalier is simply incompetent. He makes his usually effective faces (quizzical scowl, one-sided smile, etc.,) but they do not add up to a created and conveyed character. Horst Buchholz, the young German actor who plays Marius, looks exactly right and has the youthful lyric quality that fits the role. But the part is here written and directed in little piecemeal chunks, as if he were always approaching a song about the sea or about love or his lost child – a series of music-less music cues instead of a realized, organic whole. In addition Buchholz has a distracting lisp on the letter "r." Speaking of his love for Fanny, he says passionately, "It dwove me cwazy."

Pagnol wrote his plays and made his films as an ode to Marseillaise life. Here that life is used only as a different, gimmicky setting for another movie, without much of the feeling of a provincial poem. Logan's version, on which S. N. Behrman collaborated and which was prepared for the screen by Julius J. Epstein, eliminates some of the weaknesses of the original but weakens many of its strengths, and the performance is bland grape-juice compared with the rough wine of the French films.

Pagnol is said to have approved this version. I would like to sit at his side while the Boyer-Buchholz breakfast scene was run, followed by the Raimu-Fresnay scene, and I would like to have permission to quote his comments.

It is not necessary to think *By Love Possessed* a good novel (which I do not) to feel compassion for James Gould Cozzens while watching the film made from his book. Let us hope that he has little interest in the picture and will not see it. Some names of characters and some elements of the plot have been extracted and re-worked into a saccharine confection laced with sex which has more relation to the *oeuvres* of Grace Metalious than of Cozzens. A number of well-known actors have had their photographs taken while going through the motions of the plot, but the only one who suggests that he might affect us in a happier environment is Jason Robards, Jr. To read about Hollywood's troubles after seeing this picture is like reading about the New Haven Railroad's troubles after riding on their trains: it revives one's faith in justice.

STANLEY KAUFFMANN

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ART

Too Quiet on the Potomac

The long and so far futile struggle to provide the American capital with American art in appropriate depth is now centered on two possibilities, both of which are chancy at best.

In the first place, as we commented recently (in "A Home for American Art," *NR*, May 22), there is the pending legislation to turn the old Patent Office Building, an architectural monument in itself, over to the purposes of art. In the second place there is the recently-revealed offer of four New York collectors to give their substantial 20th-Century American collections to Washington's Corcoran Gallery.

The Patent Office Building is now occupied by the Civil Service Commission, which expects to vacate by 1963, moving into new quarters of its own. When this move was made known a few years ago, the immediate reaction on the part of Congress and some businessmen was to attempt to secure the building for free enterprise, tear it down and put in a parking facility. Thanks to a group of citizens and a few determined Senators, the building was saved for architectural history and it was discovered that without too many or too costly alterations, it could be used for exhibition purposes. It was decided to split the building, following the Civil Service departure, into halves, one for the Natonal Collection of Fine Arts, one for a proposed National Portrait Gallery, the material for which now exists scattered all through the government.

As we have already pointed out, two sets of legislation now exist to bring all about. One, sponsored by Senators Humphrey, Williams and Long, grants the Portrait Gallery up to one half the space of the building, reserving the rest for the National Collection of Fine Arts. The other, sponsored by Senators Anderson and Saltonstall, grants the Portrait Gallery space in all or any part of the building. To me, the Anderson-Saltonstall bill clearly leaves open the possibility that the Portrait Gallery will occupy the entire building and the National Collection of Fine Arts be left to languish, unseen, unnoticed and unprovided for in whatever odd corner the parent institution, the Smithsonian, can find. At present, and for some time past, the Fine Arts Collection has been stuck in behind the stuffed elephant and up in the attic of the Natural History Museum of the Smithsonian Institution.

Senator Anderson has replied to such criticism with assurances that the legislative history of his bill (S 1057) will show the intent of all concerned to house, at last, the Fine Arts Collection. At the same time the Senator declines to change the wording of his bill so as to safeguard the Fine Arts space; he expresses surprise, and perhaps exasperation, that anyone could imagine any peril to the future housing of the Fine Arts Collection.

Since the point at issue seems fairly technical and since assurances are forthcoming not only from Senator Anderson but from the Smithsonian as well, it is perhaps worth while recalling a few of the historical circumstances that do make some observers wonder if the Smithsonian management can be counted on to do anything for the Fine Arts Collection that isn't spelled out clearly in the legislation.

The Fine Arts Collection has existed, under the Smithsonian and as a collection of American and other art, since 1904. Its name, until 1937, was the National Gallery of Art, a name happily bestowed upon the Mellon Collection of European art in that year. Some years later, Congress passed a bill granting the Fine Arts Collection a site on the Mall for a new building within the enclave of the Smithsonian itself. Somehow, in spite of assurances and even positive legislation, the building never got built; instead, the Smithsonian used the space for an Air Museum. Within the last year or so, a Washington woman living abroad gave her house on Massachussetts Avenue to the Smithsonian with the idea of its housing all or part of the Fine Arts Collection; instead, the Smithsonian is using the building for a professional museum assocation. It is such a record, Senator Anderson should be advised, that leads the cynical among us to believe that the Smithsonian is not passionately devoted to the Fine Arts Collection. Regardless of cynicism, however, all criticism, including this, can be silenced by the simple insertion of the appropriate language in the legislation itself designed to guarantee the Fine Art Collection half the space in the Patent Office Building. A clause is all that is needed to do the trick.

Even if the clause does get inserted, or even if, without the clause and despite the record, the Smithsonian does grant half the Patent Office Building to the Fine Arts Collection, this is only a kind of license for the Collection to grow into the definitive Washington collection of American art. Certainly it is not such now; at best it will take a long time for it to become so; certainly it will never become so if kept in the second class citizenship it has hitherto enjoyed at the Smithsonian.

The other possibility in Washington now is quite different. Four collectors, including Edith Halpert and Milton Lowenthal, have offered their collections to the Corcoran. Among them, the four groups of paintings and sculpture manage total coverage in depth of the 20th Century in this country. Once brought together, the four collections would constitute a record of quality equalled only by the Metropolitan and the Whitney Museums in New York.

The Corcoran trustees, with honest and profound reluctance, have turned the offer down and are now casting about for ways to accept it. The problem is this: the donors very properly want the four collections housed in a separate wing and insist on assur-

Notes on Contributors

Sidney Hyman's *new book*, Eisenhower: Promise and Performance, *will be published next spring by Macmillan.* Daniel M. Friedenberg *writes extensively on Mediterranean affairs.* Patrick O'Donovan *is a foreign correspondent for* The Observer *(London).*

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

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ances that this be built. The trustees can't see their way to such a development for under a million dollars – half for construction, half for upkeep – and they don't have the money. The Corcoran is not a loaded institution and has in the past accepted endowments which no longer quite pay for the installation or events they were meant to take care of.

Oddly enough, here is another Washington institution more or less displaced by the National Gallery. Until 1937, the Corcoran was *the* art institution of Washington, specializing, unfortunately, in European art of something less than top quality. The logical destiny of the Corcoran is to become what Washington so desperately needs, a museum of American and contemporary art. The trustees seem to realize this; the proposed gift would make destiny a reality at a stroke; but as always there falls the shadow.

Is anyone with a million dollars listening?

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Correspondence

The New Republic *welcomes communications in regard to subjects of current interest. Those of 300 words or less are most suitable for publication.*

Confessions of a Conformist

Sirs:

Thanks for Irving Howe's review (July 3) of my book, *Confessions of a Conformist*. I did have some doubts about the timeliness of some of my points, but he resolved them. His present comments are not very different in spirit from those he made a good while ago on the same subject in *Partisan Review*, as I recall. Maybe he feels he is being followed. At any rate, conformity clearly does remain an issue, regardless of time or place, and Mr. Howe would still like to set the terms, limits, and rhetoric of the discussion.

Mr. Howe is right. The issue is not trivial. I refrained from citing his own sweepingly sentimental statements on conformity, which were so properly "intellectual" a decade ago, precisely because I insist on taking the subject seriously, and also because I respect his particular political seriousness, as well as the solemnity of his general intellectual dedication, and I had hoped that he had grown up (not merely continued in youthful anger) about conformity. He's right in sensing that he is in certain respects the type of intellectual I was writing about. His stuffy ill-temper keeps him from seeing ambiguity, hyperbole, skepticism, irony, sarcasm, shading, qualification, playfulness, even (if I may say so) humor. And why does he pretend not to know my background? Is it because he concludes that I might have as much right as he to define the subject?

He really ought to have paid more attention; it is not often that a conformist has something to confess. His boyish nastiness makes him misquote and misread my text at several perhaps crucial points. I cite the first instances that come to mind. My comment about *Life* appears in an aside in the context of an extended criticism of that magazine (for contributing to that same low character of American life Mr. Howe deplores). My remarks about the sense of status of American professors concerned only *that* aspect of academic life, and was based, as I plainly said, on the sociological investigation and comment of S. M. Lipset. The word "toilets," which he quotes as from my book, is his word, not mine. I like New York and San Francisco at least as much as Mr. Howe does, who also, I believe, lives in neither city. As some *New Republic* readers may recall from my essay on New York in its pages ("Wonderful Town?"), republished in substantially the same form in the book, my sentiments about that great city are ambivalent. I am less ambivalent about San Francisco. I love it. True affection, however, is always spiced by reservations. And could Mr. Howe be attempting haughty ignorance, or whimsicality, in calling a Porsche a Portia? The quality of his anger is strained.

Morris Freedman
Albuquerque, New Mexico

In reply:

On page 191 of his book Mr. Freedman writes: "As for diplomas, especially beyond the baccalaureate, these are normally hung in toilets" – so the word, as well as the wise sentence in which it appears, is indeed his. On page 16 he writes: ". . . I do not belong to the nonconformist faction which criticizes *Life*; all in all, if anyone cares, I think the magazine is all right." That's what the man said, and that's what, in attacking him, I said. Let Mr. Freedman have the courage of his sentences.

That S. M. Lipset might share the view that "American intellectuals lust for" the status which would require "professors' wives [to] be called 'Mrs. Professor'" does not make it any the less absurd. As for Portia-Porsche: alas, I will never live it down nor, I'm happy to say, will the *NR* copy editor.

Irving Howe

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Down with Us

Sirs:

I have been a reader of your magazine for many years and have often found your insights on contemporary affairs, especially those relating to Father Eisenhower's regime, prescient and straightforward. Your publication of William Costello's articles and the cartoons of Mauldin and Osborn on Nixon was a distinctive public service.

It has indeed been sad to watch the debacle in your pages since the bright morning of the Kennedy administration. With TRB's frenetic hero-worship, with Frederic Collins' platitudinous paean, and with chauvinistic, fence-straddling editorials on Cuba, *The New Republic* has degenerated into a liberal caricature of *Time*. Your status as the official apologists of the power-hungry liberalism of the New Frontier is a dubious honor.

John David Ober
Graduate Student
Brandeis University

A Statement from Robert Penn Warren

Sirs:

This letter is prompted by a review of my essay *The Legacy of the Civil War* (*NR, May 15*). I could wish that Mr. Peter d'A. Jones had thought better of my essay, or at least of my intellectual integrity, but I am not now writing in defense of either. What I want to do here is to disabuse those readers who may feel, from Mr. Jones' review, that I have much sympathy with Mr. Robert Patterson of the Citizens' Committee of Mississippi, whom he cites with, perhaps, some effect of guilt by association. The quickest thing for me to do is to state three things – things which it is strange for any citizen to feel constrained to state:

1. It is morally right, as well as politically and economically necessary, that all the rights and privileges of American citizenship be guaranteed to all citizens.

2. A man's worth should be judged by his qualities of manhood.

3. Any official of any state who does not honestly and vigorously endeavor to punish, with full rigor, any violence against, or coercion of, any individual or group has violated his public trust and should be impeached.

I suppose that a reader can easily infer from these statements my attitude in specific instances, as I had assumed one might from other writings of mine, including *The Legacy of the Civil War;* but I shall add that I think Dr. Martin Luther King a great man, and that the sit-ins conducted according to his principles are morally unassailable, and will win. One reason they will win is that they offer, even to the man howling from the sidewalk, an exhibition of courage, dignity and self-control.

One more thing: since Mr. Jones takes the trouble to quote from me in 1929, I wish he had taken the trouble in his researches to glance at my explicit repudiation, some time back, of what I said in 1929. In 1929, in my youth, I was wrong and even now I sometimes do not feel myself entirely above error.

Robert Penn Warren
Morbihan, France

West Berlin and War

Sirs:

Congratulations on Gerald Johnson's magnificant July 10 article. Our government should do what it can to protect West Berliners but without forgetting an even greater duty to preserve the lives of millions of Americans who might die in a war which it should still be possible to prevent.

Clarence Poe
Senior Editor
The Progressive Farmer
Raleigh, North Carolina

Military Indoctrination of Civilians

Sirs:

This is just a note of grateful appreciation for your article entitled "Military Indoctrination of Civilians" by Frederic W. Collins in the June 26 issue.

I attended a national security seminar recently and came away thoroughly shaken. To have this word in your columns confirming my judgment makes me feel not quite so alone.

Austin Harper Richardson, Pastor
Wesley Memorial Methodist Church
Yakima, Washington

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THE BRUTAL LEGACY OF THE CIVIL WAR

This year marks the celebration of the centennial of the Civil War, a war that was fought to resolve a great moral issue. Scores of books appear annually on the military aspects of the war, pilgrimages are made to the battlefields of the war and seminars and discussions are held regularly to examine the most minute military problems of the war. Yet the basic issue over which the war was fought, the question of the black man's right to justice as afforded the white man, remains unresolved.

Slavery was abolished by the war, of course, but the basic problem of one race's inhumanity to another remained and, as a matter of fact, began to express itself in violent forms which never existed before the war and which are still with us after one hundred years. A powerful new book entitled THE BRUTAL LEGACY OF THE CIVIL WAR is about to be published. It is by Ralph Ginzburg, noted historical researcher and best-selling author. In the book over two hundred cases of outrages against the rights of Negroes are detailed. They include instances of almost unbelievable brutality and cannibalism. The cases span the years 1880 to 1961. Each case is a dramatic narrative that reads like fiction but which is actually factual and fully documented. The cases include instances of inter-racial couples forcibly separated, Negroes mutilated and murdered for attempting to exercise their right to vote and Negroes lynched for no other reason except that they happened to be Negroes. Included in the book are accounts of over 100 lynchings. Take, for example, the following eyewitness account of a lynching that took place near Newnan, Georgia, which is included among many such accounts in the book:

Sam Holt, the Negro who is thought to have murdered Alfred Cranford and assailed Cranford's wife, was burned at the stake one mile and a quarter from Newnan, Ga., Sunday afternoon at 2:30 o'clock.

Fully 2,000 people surrounded the small sapling to which he was fastened and watched the flames eat away his flesh, saw his body mutilated by knives and witnessed the contortions of his body in his extreme agony.

Two counties, Campbell and Coweta, directly interested in the crimes of the Negro, and the entire state have waited with impatience for the moment when the Negro would pay the penalty for his fiendish deeds.

Such suffering has seldom been witnessed, and through it all the Negro uttered hardly a cry. Those who witnessed the affair saw the Negro meet his death and saw him tortured before the flames with unfeigning satisfaction.

For sickening sights, harrowing details and blood-curdling incidents, the burning of Holt is unsurpassed by any occurrence of a like kind ever heard of in the history of Georgia.

A few smouldering ashes scattered about the place, a blackened stake, are all that was left to tell the story. Not even the bones of the Negro were left in peace, but were eagerly snatched by a crowd of people drawn from all directions, who almost fought over the burning body of the man, carving it with their knives and seeking souvenirs of the occurrence.

Holt went to the stake with as much courage as any one could possibly have possessed on such an occasion, and the only murmur that issued from his lips was when angry knives plunged into his flesh and his life's blood sizzled in the fire before his eyes.

Then he cried, "Oh, my God! Oh, Jesus."

The crowd that burned Holt believed it had made no mistake of his guilt or identity. After the first flames licked at his feet, he was temporarily removed from the sapling at which time he is said to have admitted his guilt.

One of the strangest features of the entire affair is the part played in the execution by a northern man. This man, whose name would not be divulged by those who knew him, announced that he was from the north, while he calmly saturated Holt's clothing with kerosene oil.

Mrs. Cranford, the rape victim, was not permitted to identify the Negro. She is ill and it was thought the shock would be too great for her. The crowd was satisfied with the identification of Holt by Mrs. Cranford's mother who did not, however, actually see Holt commit the crime.

Masks played no part of the lynching. There was no secrecy; no effort to prevent anyone seeing who lighted the fire, who cut off the ears or who took the head. On the trunk of a tree nearby was pinned a placard containing the following words:

"We Must Protect Our Southern Women."

THE BRUTAL LEGACY OF THE CIVIL WAR is over 100,000 words long. It is illustrated by contemporary engravings and photographs. It will sell in bookstores for $6.95. It is offered now at the special pre-publication price of $4.95. To order your copy, send check or money order for $4.95 together with coupon below to The Olive Branch Press, 110 W. 40th Street, New York 18, N. Y.

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